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AH EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE JODICIAL 
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FOR FEDERAL INCOME TAX PURPOSES
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
One method employed by businesses to increase the 
availability o£ depreciation deductions and investment tax 
credits involves the use of leveraged leases. These 
transactions allow the transferal of tax benefits, such as 
investment tax credits and depreciation deductions, from 
taxpayers who do not have sufficient tax liabilities to 
fully utilize them to those that do. Due to the liquid 
nature of these benefits, the Internal Revenue Service 
(hereafter referred to as the Service) has examined lease 
transactions to determine whether they were actually 
conditional sales. Potential lessees and lessors have been
forced to analyze complex and often contradictory judicial
decisions and administrative rulings to avoid 
reclassification of the agreement as a sale, thereby 
eliminating the tax advantages of leases.
The Service and judiciary have agreed that the original 
intention of the lessor and lessee should govern the
transaction's tax status. However, there has been
considerable disagreement on how this should be done. Two
2strikingly different tests have been developed by the 
judiciary to determine original intent. The first, the 
economic test, seeks to ascertain whether there vas a 
reasonable economic basis at the time of contract to infer 
that the parties originally intended the transaction to be a 
sale. By considering only economic relationships, advocates 
of this test claim that it provides for more consistency of 
application than would exist if a more subjective approach 
were employed.
In contrast, advocates of the intent test maintain that 
economic elements are only part of the factors to be 
considered in determining the parties' intent. Moreover, 
they aver that within the limits of reason, the lessor and 
lessee have the right to exercise their own judgement in 
structuring their transactions. Accordingly, their "intent" 
test is not as mechanical as the economic test and analyzes 
all of the facts in the lease agreement, economic and 
noneconomic, in determining proper tax classification.
To reduce the uncertainty of application caused by 
these conflicting tests and encourage leveraged leases. 
Congress enacted safe-harbor rules in the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-34) that delineated the
circumstances when a lease existed between two or more 
parties. However, these rules only applied to transactions 
whose lessor was a corporation leasing assets eligible for 
the investment tax credit. Consequently, noncorporate 
lessors (individuals, partnerships. Subchapter s
3corporations, and personal holding companies) and all 
parties leasing real estate were excluded from partaking of 
the advantages these new safe-harbor rules offer. instead, 
they had to adhere to the aforementioned judicial and 
administrative guidelines.
àfter their enactment, the safe-harbor provisions came 
under severe criticism as being too generous to 
corporations. Since they were expected to reduce tax 
revenues by at least $41.6 billion over the next six years 
(Joint Committee on Taxation, 1982, p. 35), Congress felt 
the country simply could not afford them in a period of 
record budget deficits. Consequently, the safe-harbor rules 
were repealed for years after 1983 by the Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-248). Subsequent 
transactions must have some economic substance in order to 
avoid reclassification.
In place of the repealed provisions, the Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act created "finance leases." These 
leases provide advantages to leases that would have 
qualified under the former safe-harbor rules that are not 
available to regular leases. For example, a finance lease 
may permit the lessee to purchase the leased property for a 
fixed amount, as long as the option is at least 10% of the 
property's original cost. In contrast, the Service would 
prohibit fixed options for regular leases. As will be 
demonstrated in Chapter II, no definitive criteria or 
guidelines are apparent from lease litigation despite the
4fact that noncorporate lessors are forced to rely upon it. 
Moreover, it is not even clear whether courts abide by the 
pronouncements on leases made by the Service. As a result, 
nonsafe-harbor lessors and lessees are confronted with 
considerable uncertainty as to the proper treatment of their 
lease transactions. This study attempts to reduce this 
confusion by systematically analyzing lease litigation. The 
next section examines the various issues investigated.
POEPOSE OF THE STODT
The objective of this study is to identify factors used 
by the judiciary in distinguishing between sales and leases 
for Federal Income Tax purposes. The complexity inherent in 
this issue has caused taxpayers and the Service to often 
disagree with respect to the proper type of classification, 
resulting in considerable litigation. While these decisions 
have been analyzed previously, no systematic assessment of 
those factors crucial in differentiating between sales and 
leases has been undertaken. This study attempts to fill 
this void by addressing five research questions.
Research ^aes^on 1. ghat Facers Kxplain ^dicial
Distinctions between Sales and Leases?
To identify factors utilized by the judiciary, a
statistical model was developed based on relevant judicial 
decisions. The primary source of data was opinions of lease 
versus sale litigation in the court of original
jurisdiction.
5The coefficients developed by the model can be used to 
determine the variables' relative importance. However, no 
conclusion could be made that judges actually used these 
weights, but only that the model predicts their decisions.
Research Question 2. Is a Model Deyeloged Only from 
Court Cases Different from One Developed for the Court of 
Çluims and District Courts?
Since lease versus purchase cases have been litigated 
in several judicial forums, various approaches may have 
been taken to resolve this issue. Any lack of uniformity 
may be due to differences in backgrounds and expertise of 
the judges in the different forums. Specifically, Tax Court 
judges come from tax practice backgrounds and try only tax 
related cases. In contrast, judges in the Court of Claims 
and District Courts do not necessarily come from tax 
practice backgrounds and hear primarily nontax cases. 
Naturally, this limits the amount of specialization in 
taxation for Court of Claims and District Court judges. 
Moreover, judicial inconcistency has been shown to exist in 
another area of taxation. Kramer (1982) determined that 
decisions valuing large blocks of publicly traded stocks in 
the District Courts and Court of Claims were significantly 
different from those in the Tax Court. This may indicate 
that selection of the judicial forum can affect the outcome 
of the case.
To determine whether this judicial diversity is also 
true with leases, the accuracy of the original model's
6classifications for Tax and District Court classifications 
were compared and contrasted. Additionally, a separate 
model was developed for Tax Court cases. Differences in 
classification accuracy, significant variables and related 
weights from the original model were used to indicate any 
differing approaches have been used. Intercircuit
controversy could not be statistically determined because 
of the relatively small sample size. Nonetheless, a visual 
analysis of misclassifications of the original model did not 
reveal any noticeably different judicial patterns.
Research Question 3. H ^ e  the Facers ^ d  Their ^ l a ^ v e  
lEEortance Changed Over Time?
Decisions involving proper classification of lease 
transactions have covered a period of over forty years. If 
the judicial analysis changed over time, factors developed 
in Research Question 1 may not be reliable in predicting 
future decisions since they could incorporate patterns no 
longer in use. Accordingly, the stability of this model 
needed to be determined. Though no statistical tests exist 
in the statistical technique used to do this, a heuristic 
method developed by Stewart (1582) was employed. In this 
method, decisions are segregated into time periods with a 
logit function developed separately for cases in each 
period. The separate models are compared to determine 
whether differences in significant variables or coefficients 
exist, which may suggest changes over time. To further 
check for instability, each function was used to predict
7cases in the other time periods. An analysis of the 
accurac V of the classification and any resulting 
misclassifications provided further indications of any shift 
in the decision variables over time.
Research Question U. Can ^ e  Reguirements of Rev. Proc. 
75-12 Ex£lain Judicial Decisions?
As mill be discussed in Chapter II, the Service's 
positions in Rev. Procs. 75-12 (1975-1 CB 715) and 75-28 
(1975-1 CB 752) may be contrary to accepted case lav because 
they require accurate predictions of future values, while 
commentators believe the judiciary does not (e.g. Berlin, 
1976). This research question seeks to determine whether 
any divergence actually exists between the Service and 
judiciary. To do this, the guidelines developed in these 
revenue procedures will be used to classify transactions 
contained in lease versus sales cases.
EesÊâÇÇà Question 5. Are t ^  Guidelines Developed By t ^  
Accounting Profession in FASB 13 Consistent Hith the 
dudiciaryls Position?
Taxpayers have not only had to consider the tax 
consequences of their lease transactions, but also the 
appropriate accounting presentation. The proper
classification of leases has been of great concern to the 
accounting profession so that users of financial statements 
can evaluate the impact of lease commitments. Several 
opinions and statements have been issued, seeking to
8distinguish between leases that have the characteristics of 
sales (known as capital leases) from those that do not 
(known as operating leases)- 1-. Differences in accounting 
and tax rules have caused a great deal of complexity. 
However, the requirements of the most recent accounting 
statement, F&SB 13, appear to be very similar to the 
Service's positions in its two principal pronouncements, 
Eev. Proc, 75-12 and Rev, Rul, 55-540 (1955-2 CB 39) -2-, 
The objective of FkSB 13 was to have leases that transfer 
most of the benefits and risks of ownership accounted for as 
sales (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1976), To 
accomplish this, a transaction would be treated as a capital 
lease if any of the following criteria are present:
a. The lessee will automatically become owner at the 
end of the lease term.
b. The lease contains a bargain purchase clause.
c. The lease term is 75% or more of the estimated 
useful life.
d. The present value of the minimum rental payments is 
greater than or equal to 90% of the property's 
original fair market value less any investment tax 
credit retained by lessor.
Figure 1-1 compares these requirements with those 
previously issued by the Service. The first three
-1- ARB No. 38. APB No. 5, APB No. 7, APB No. 27, APB No.
31, and FASB No. 13.
-2- Both of these are discussed in detail in Chapter II.
Figure 1-1
CoapariBOB of FASB Bo. 13*s and Service*a Poaltions on Leamea
Requirements of FASB 13
Stated Previously by the Service in: 
Rev. Rul. 55-540 Rev. Proc. 75-12
Yes______   Ho_______ Yea ______Ro
1. Lessee automatically becoaea
owner at end of term.
2. Lease contains a bargain
purchase clause.
3. Lease term is 75% or more of
the estimated useful life.
4. The present value of ainiaua
rental payments is greater 
than or equal to 90% of the 
property's original fair 
market value less any invest** 
meat tax credit retained by 
lessor.
X
X
X
X
a. Rev. Proc. 75-12 considers a lease to be s sale if the lease term is 80% of useful 
life.
b. Rev. Rule 55-540 comperes the future values of rental payments and beginning fair 
market value.
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requirements have been explicitly stated by the Service in 
previous positions. Proc. 75-12. Though the Service had 
not specifically referred to the fourth, it had a very 
similar requirement in Rev. Rul. 55-540 (1955-2 CB 39). 
This requirement compares the future value of beginning fair 
market value under a hypothetical sale with total lease 
payments while F&SB 13 concentrates on the present values of 
these terms. Accordingly, these two provisions are 
essentially equivalent.
While the similarity of application between the private 
sector and executive branch of the federal government is 
encouraging, it is not sufficient to reduce the complexity 
caused by different rules for taxation and accounting. To do 
this, the judiciary must also abide by these guidelines. 
Accordingly, this study will examine judicial decisions to 
determine whether any difference exists.
LIMITATIONS
While the models developed in this study can be used by 
taxpayers to predict future decisions, it must be remembered 
that the judicial system is dynamic in nature. That is, 
additional variables may be introduced into the issue 
through changes in the code, regulations, or leasing 
environment. Consequently, taxpayers should not blindly 
follow the model's predictions.
A sample bias in this study may exist if nonlitigated 
cases differ from those that have been litigated.
11
Presumably, in litigated cases taxpayers carefully examine 
their transaction before they decided to contest a 
reclassification by the Service. Some variables may be 
important in this decision if they automatically determine 
that the court would agree with the Service. Accordingly, 
taxpayers would not be willing to challenge the Service in 
those circumstances. If this is true, litigated cases in 
general may have similar characteristics. When cases 
involving both possible outcomes (sales and leases) have 
similar values for certain variables, these variables would 
not be found to be statistically significant discriminators. 
As a result, factors may be important in the decision to 
litigate but still not be statistically significant in this 
study.
The source of data may be biased if judges attempt to 
justify their decisions by including in their opinions only 
those variables that strengthen their position. 
Nonetheless, the omission of relevant factors could cause 
the decision to be appealed to a higher court. This 
possibility of appeal should reduce the propensity for 
judges to omit relevant information.
Bias may occur in coding the variables because the 
decision is reported in the judicial opinion before the 
facts of the case are described. This prior knowledge of 
the dependent variable could inadvertently influence the 
measurement of the independent variables, especially when 
they are somewhat ambiguous in nature. Copeland, Taylor,
12
and Brown (1981) have determined that this foreknowledge 
does have a significant impact upon the data collection 
process. Specifically, subjects in a lab experiment were 
inclined to code variables in such a manner that they
appeared consistent with the judicial decision. These
biased measures artificially strengthened the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables to create 
what was in essence a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Due to the seriousness of this observation bias,
Copeland, et. al. have suggested three methods that can be
used to reduce its impact:
a) Two or more individuals should independently gather 
the research data.
b) The person who plans the study and has a strong 
commitment to its outcome should not collect the 
data.
c) Kn independent audit should be made of the data.
Given the constraints of a dissertation, the first two
suggestions are not appropriate. However the third is 
feasible and was used in this study.
CONTBIBOTIONS OF THE STUDY
The statistical results of this study should be able to 
be used in several ways. First, lessors and lessees of 
nonsafe-harbor leases can incorporate the identified factors 
into their leasing transactions to minimize the risk of 
reclassification. Furthermore, the logit model could be 
used to evaluate the probability of a favorable court
13
ruliag» This could assist taxpayers in their decision of 
whether or not to contest a reclassification of the lease by 
the Internal Bevenue Service.
Additionally, Congress may be able to utilize the 
results in any subsequent revision of leasing rules. The 
variables identified by this study could provide a workable 
test due to their consistent application by the judiciary in 
its determination of the economic substance of lease 
agreements. An incorporation of these factors as safe- 
harbor rules could reduce uncertainty while still 
recognizing the economic essence of the transaction.
The statistical technique used to examine the decisions 
was logit analysis. AS will be discussed in Chapter III, 
this is a significant advancement over the often used linear 
discriminant analysis because it can systematically analyze 
the data without assuming away its basic structural 
relationship. Besearch similar to this study may be helpful 
to taxpayers and tax policymakers when they are confronted 
with uncertainty in other areas of taxation.
OOTLINE OF CHAPTERS
This study is divided into six chapters with Chapter I 
serving as the introduction. Chapter II examines the 
development of guidelines distinguishing between sales and 
leases by the judiciary and Service. This analysis is 
supplemented in Chapter III with a review of prior lease 
studies.
Chapter IV discusses the statistical techniques
14
utilized in this study and contrasts them to those used in 
other areas of tax research. The empirical findings are
reported in Chapter V.
The research conclusions are summarized and interpreted 
in Chapter VI. In addition, recommendations for future 
research are put forth.
15
CHAPTER II 
LEASE VERSOS SALE GUIDELINES
The objective of this chapter is to identify guidelines 
developed by the judiciary and Service that have been used 
to distinguish between sales and leases. To provide a 
framework for this discussion, relevant Internal Revenue 
Code sections are analyzed. Subsequently, various judicial 
and administrative positions are examined, with particular 
emphasis placed upon differences and similarities of the 
different approaches.
LEASE TRANSACTIONS
Individuals often choose lease arrangements in order to 
use high-cost equipment without incurring fixed equity 
commitments required by conventional financing sources if 
the property were purchased. Lease transactions can take 
two basic forms: direct leases and leveraged leases. In
direct leases the manufacturer or owner negotiates directly
with a lessee to form a lease contract. These contracts 
generally stipulate that in return for periodic rental 
payments made by the lessee, the lessor will provide any
necessary maintenance to the leased property. A lease
option clause is often included to allow lessees to purchase
their rented property at a future time. These clauses are
16
often benefitial to lessees since they allow lessees to 
acquire the use of expensive equipment with no initial 
commitment of funds and later obtain title by exercising the 
option.
In the late 1960s, leveraged leases, a much more 
complicated form of lease, became common. In their simplest 
form, leveraged leases consist of three parties: a lessor,
a lender, and a lessee. The lessor purchases property from 
the manufacturer by making a small down payment and 
borrowing the balance from a lender. He then leases the 
property to the lessee who does not have any direct contact 
with the manufacturer. Typically, he also shifts the costs 
of upkeep and performance of the property or equipment to 
the lessee.
In addition to enabling lessees avoid conventional 
financing sources, leveraged leases also permit benefits of 
investment tax credits and depreciation deductions to be 
shifted to other taxpayers. Specifically, a company with a 
large tax liability can purchase equipment with a small down 
payment, finance the balance by using the property itself as 
security, and then lease it to the party that originally 
intended to use it. Since the lessor owns the property, he 
is entitled to utilize the accelerated cost recovery system 
(the newly enacted cost recovery system, hereafter referred 
to as iCBS), investment tax credit, and any other tax 
benefit associated with ownership. Part of these advantages 
can be passed to the lessee in the form of smaller rental
17
charges. As a result, both parties have benefited 
significantly. This procedure is illustrated below.
Example (1): BE, a marginal company, needs to
purchase equipment costing $1,000,000 with a life of 10 
years and a 5-year ACES recovery period. If RE 
purchases equipment directly, it would finance the 
acquisition price through First City National Bank. 
First City National would require RE to make a down 
payment of 20 percent of the acquisition cost with the 
balance financed at a rate of prime plus 5 percent. 
Onder this method, BE is required to commit itself to a 
substantial initial investment and make large periodic 
payments. But it cannot utilize or take advantage of
the investment tax credit or ACRS deductions because of
its small net income.
As a result, a leveraged lease arrangement might 
be more beneficial to BE. Lease Property Company, a 
profitable leasing company, could acquire the property 
needed by BE by making an initial payment of 20 percent
of the acquisition price and financing the balance at
prime, due to its profitable status. Since Lease 
Property is the owner, it can take advantage of the 
investment tax credit and ACRS deductions. Next, it 
can lease the equipment to BE for nine years, passing 
part of the tax benefits by charging a lower rent. 
Thus, RE is receiving the use of the property for 
almost the entire life of the asset with no initial 
investment and for lower periodic payments than would 
have been incurred if the property had been directly 
purchased. Puthermore, it could later acquire title to 
the equipment by exercising a purchase option.
The tax consequences just discussed generally occur
when the lessor is a corporation. If the lessor is not a
corporation, it can take the investment tax credit only if
one of the following conditions is met (Sec. 46 (e) (3):
1) The lessor manufactured the asset.
2) The lease term, including all renewal options, 
is less than 50% of the prior Class Life Asset 
Depreciation Range System useful life and the 
expenses of the lessor associated with the 
asset during the first twelve months exceed 
fifteen percent of the related rental income.
18
If neither of these conditions are met, the credit cannot be 
taken by the lessor but can still be passed to the lessee.
&s long as a lease is considered valid by tax 
standards, the tax benefits originally conceived by the 
parties would be achieved. On the other hand, if the lease 
is actually a conditional sale, different tax consequences 
will result. These divergent tax results arise because the 
"lessor" would then be considered as having sold equipment 
to the "lessee." This requires recognition of any gain in 
the year of sale instead of reporting rental income over the 
term of the lease. Any benefits derived from the investment 
tax credit and accelerated cost recovery system must be 
recaptured because of the equipment's early disposition. 
Though the lessee-purchaser may be able to utilize the 
investment tax credit or accelerated cost recovery system, 
the amount of investment tax credit available may be reduced 
because the equipment would now be considered used property. 
Also, the lessee-purchaser would not be able to deduct 
periodic rental payments but would instead be required to 
capitalize the principal element as the asset's cost.
Safe-harbor rules
In the enactment of the Economic Recovery lax Act of 
1961 (hereafter referred to as ERTA), Congress displayed its 
concern with the reduced capital investment by business. To 
provide greater incentives for increased capital investment, 
a more rapid cost recovery system was offered. This system.
19
known as the Accelerated Cost Recovery System, and 
corresponding liberalized investment tax credit were viewed 
by Congress as providing the greatest benefit to the economy 
if they were made easily available to the corporate sector 
(U.S. Congress, 1981, p. 6). Since one method of 
increasing their availability is through leveraged leases. 
Congress enacted special safe-harbor rules in Section 
168(f)(8) which allow lease parties to jointly treat the 
lessor as owner of the property if several requirements are 
met. Specifically, the lessor must have an "at risk 
investment" of 10% of the adjusted basis of the property 
throughout the life of the lease. Additionally, the lease's 
term (including extensions) cannot exceed the greater of 90% 
of the property's useful life or 150% of the midpoint life 
of the property under prior Class Life Asset Depreciation 
Range System (hereafter referred to as ADR). The property 
must be new and qualify for the investment tax credit. One 
great advantage of safe-harbor leases is that property 
leased within 90 days of acquisition will still qualify as 
new property. This allows the lessor in a sale-leaseback 
arrangement to fully utilize the available investment tax 
credit.
Impact of the Tax Iauit£ and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
1982
The new safe-harbor rules were extremely successful in 
reducing tax liabilities. That is, the Joint Committee on 
Taxation (1982) estimated that these provisions would reduce
20
revenue by $3.2 billion in 1982, $4 billion in 1983, $5.7
billion in 1984, $7.1 billion in 1985, $9.5 billion in 1986, 
and $12.1 billion in 1987. Naturally, in a period of record 
budget deficits, this was not viewed as a positive
situation. Critics of these provisions avered they were too 
generous to corporations at the expense of the rest of the 
public. In response to this furor. Congress drastically 
reduced the benefits associated with safe-harbor leasing 
though legislation in the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982 (hereafter refered to as TEFBà)« 
This crackdown covered the entire scope of safe-harbor
leasing, from limitations in allowable deductions to 
outright repeal for years after 1983. Each new provision in 
TEFBA is subsequently analyzed in order to understand the 
impact these changes have upon this study.
Maximum Lease Term. As discussed above, ERTA stipulated
that the length of safe-harbor leases could not exceed the 
greater of 90% of the property's expected useful life or ADR 
midpoint life. In effect, this allowed lessees to rent 
assets for substantially their entire productive period. 
TEFRA added another requirement prohibiting rental periods 
(including extensions) from exceeding the upper ADR limit as 
of January 1, 1981. This provision has the impact of
reducing the length of rental term, preventing lessors from 
using leased assets for most of their useful lives. This 
could reduce the attractiveness of leasing situations since 
lessors would now have increased uncertainty associated with
21
disposing of the asset for their remaining lives.
Limited Reduction of Tax Liability. Prior to TEFRA, lessors 
could use deductions and credits stemming from safe-harbor 
leases to reduce their total income tax. Nov these 
advantages are limited to 50% of the lessor's tax liability. 
Though disallowed credits or deductions can be carried over 
to subsequent years, the amount of these advantages has been 
reduced. Specifically, for property placed into service 
after July 1, 1982, the ACRS deduction for safe-harbor lease 
property must be computed using the 150% declining balance 
method, with a switch to straight-line in later years. No 
longer can depreciation be calculated using the accelerated 
ACRS method. Furthermore, the full investment tax credit 
cannot be claimed in the initial year. Instead, it is to be 
taken ratably over five years, with 20% allowable in each 
year.
The benefits to lessees were also limited. The amount 
of a lessee's property that may qualify as a safe-harbor 
lease say not exceed 45% of the cost basis of the lessee's 
qualified lease property placed into service.-1- Also, safe- 
harbor treatment is prohibited for leases of public utility 
property and all leases between related parties.
-1- Qualified lease property is the cost basis of all 
property that has been safe-harbored, plus Section 38 
property that has been placed in service during the year, 
and the cost of leveraged leases whose term does not exceed 
50% of the present ADR midpoint life and on which safe- 
harbor treatment was not elected.
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Finance Leases. Not only did Congress reduce the advantages 
of safe-harbor leases, but it also repealed them for years 
after 1983. In their place, "finance leases" were created, 
which must meet most of the requirements for nonsafe-harbor 
rules delineated in Rev. Proc. 75-12. Basically, this 
revenue procedure requires for transactions to have the 
economic effect of leases. Nevertheless, Congress exempted 
finance leases from two of these requirements. 
Specifically, the contract can be for limited use property 
and can contain a fixed option price that is only 10% of the 
original value. As will be discussed subsequently in this 
chapter, both of these exceptions are denied to ordinary 
leases.
Generally, to qualify as a finance lease, the lessor 
must be a corporation. In addition, leases of Sec. 38 
property used for farming purposes will qualify even if the 
lessor is not a corporation, as long as eligible farm 
property does not exceed $150,000 during any calendar year. 
The limitations enacted by TEFRA for safe-harbor leases also 
apply to finance leases.
Since most noncorporate taxpayers are excluded from the 
advantages of finance leases, they must qualify as valid 
leases under all guidelines established by the Service and 
judiciary. The remainder of this section examines these 
judicial and administrative positions in order to identify 
relevant factors in the classification of transactions as 
leases or sales.
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Statutorx Guidance
Code Section 162(a)(3) provides some guidance in
determining the deductibility of rents. It allows
deductions for:
rentals or other payments required to be made as a 
condition to the continued use or possession, for 
purposes of the trade or business, of property to which 
the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in 
which he has no equity.
This section stipulates that rents are not deductible 
if the transaction is actually a sale. This means that if 
any one of three conditions are present indicating a sale 
has actually taken place, rental payments must be 
capitalized. The first condition exists when title has 
shifted, as in a purchase with a mortgage. The second 
provision denies a rental deduction when the taxpayer is 
formally in the process of obtaining title. Neither of 
these instances is too complex. Nonetheless, the third 
condition, the acquisition by the taxpayer of an "equity" in 
the property, is less clear because equity is not used in 
the legal sense of an equitable title in property, but 
rather in an economic sense of value. That is, the taxpayer 
is receiving an interest in property in exchange for his 
payments (Schwanbeck, 1961). Since the Code provides no 
clarification as to when a lessee receives an equity 
interest, it becomes imperative to examine and analyze 
judicial and administrative positions.
JUDICIAL INTEBPBETATIOHS 
Even before the first income tax in the United States,
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the judiciary had to determine whether a lessee had acquired 
an equity in property. In 1876, the United States Supreme 
Court stated in Harvey v, Rhode Island Locomotive Works (93 
US 664 (1876)) that the purpose, rather than form, of the 
agreement, should be decisive in determining whether the 
transaction was a lease or conditional sale. Other judicial 
forums have applied this principle to tax cases by 
ascertaining whether there was reasonable economic basis at 
the time of contract to infer that a sale was intended 
(Mertens, (1981)). If the parties did not originally intend 
for the transaction to be a sale, the lease will be valid 
even if the lessee subsequently purchased the asset. 
Although original intent is critical, determining it can be 
very difficult because many factors are not relevant. For 
example, existence of a purchase option is not controlling, 
because it merely signifies that the lessee hopes to 
purchase the asset. Here hope does not create an equity 
interest (Mertens, (1981)). Additionally, the exercise of 
an option does not indicate the original intention of the 
parties.
Economic Test
Because of the difficulty inherent in determining 
intent, it is not surprising that many courts have utilized 
different tests to deduce original intent. The Tax Court 
and most circuit courts have relied upon an objective 
analysis known as the economic test. This test regards
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transactions as sales if lessees receive anything of value
other than use of the property. is a practical approach,
the lax Court has developed the following principle:
If payments are large enough to exceed the depreciation 
and value of the property and thus give the payor an 
equity in the property, it is less a distortion of 
income to regard the payments as purchase price and 
allow depreciation on the property than to offset the 
entire payment against the income of one year ( Chicago 
Stoker Corp. TC 4U1 (1950), at 445).
Consequently, if the option is exercisable within a period
less than the useful life of the property and rental
payments approximate the property's cost, then the Tax Court
would conclude that the lessee and lessor intended to have a
conditional sale.
This position is illustrated in Marvin Berry (11 TCfl
301 (1952)). In this case, the taxpayer paid $30,000 for
two year's rent on a farm. After two years, he exercised an
option to buy the farm for an additional $100,000. Since
two years are obviously less than the property's useful life
and total payments of $130,000 approximated the farm's cost,
the Tax Court held that this was a conditional sale.
The judiciary can also determine the intention of the
parties by comparing the option purchase price and the
asset's anticipated fair market value. The Tax Court in
Benton (197 P.2d 745) emphasized that a lessee did not
acquire any equity if the property's expected value was less
than the option price. However, if it did exceed the option
price, the court would conclude that the lessee did have an
equity interest. That is, since the lessee would be
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acquiring property for less than its fair market value, he 
would be receiving economic benefits in addition to the use 
of the property.
The Tax Court has also required rents paid to represent 
fair rental value, especially when the contract contains an 
option to purchase clause. In Haggard (2U TC 1124 (1955)), 
the taxpayers rented land for amounts significantly higher 
than fair rental value. Simultaneous with the lease was an 
option agreement, costing $2,000, allowing the lessee to 
purchase the land for $24,000 in January 1950. The total 
payments of $43,000 equaled the amount for which the lessor 
had previously tried to sell the land. The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's application of the 
economic test and denied the rental deduction (241 F.2d 288 
(Ca-9, 1957)). The court maintained that the documents
conferred an equity to the lessee because he could not 
economically sustain the loss of paying excessive rents 
without exercising the option. As a result, the rental 
payments could not be deducted.
Intent Test
While the economic test provides an objective method 
for determining original intent, it has not met with favor 
in all judicial forums. Specifically, the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have rejected this test as too 
arbitrary on the grounds that economic elements are only 
part of the factors to be considered in determining intent. 
This intent test was developed by the Fifth Circuit in its
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Benton (197 F.2d 7U6) decision.
In Benton. the Fifth Circuit stated that any decision 
based soley on a rigid application of the economic test 
avoided the main question of whether the parties actually 
intended the transaction to be a sale. The economic 
relationship of the purchase option price and fair market 
value of the property is only one factor to be considered in 
this analysis. Futhermore.it must be examined in light of 
the time of the creation of the contract instead of at the 
exercise date. To do otherwise places the parties at an 
extreme disadvantage. The court felt, that within the 
limits of reason, the lessor and lessee have the right to 
exercise their own judgement in structuring their 
transactions.
The Fifth Circuit also emphasized that the option price 
in Benton was not unreasonably low because the market price 
did decrease during the rental period. Naturally, it was 
reasonable to have anticipated an even greater decline. 
These factors, coupled with reasonable rental payments, led 
the court to conclude that the parties intended to create a 
lease. is a result, the rental payments were deductible 
until the option was exercised.
Differing ipplication of Intent Test. The Seventh Circuit 
also rejected rigid application of the economic test in its 
Breece Veneer and Panel Company (232 F.2d 322) decision, but 
it provided a slightly different application of the intent 
test. In 1941, Breece Veneer attempted to purchase the
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principal plant he had been leasing from Reconstruciton 
Finance Corporation (hereafter referred to as RFC). 
However, RFC rejected his initial offer as too low. Since 
Breece Veneer lacked the resources to purchase the plant for 
a higher price, he proposed that RFC redesign the lease 
contract by including an option to purchase the plant. RFC 
accepted this new offer, and the lease was amended.
The terms of the lease provided for 5100,000 to be paid 
in equal monthly payments over five years, renewable for 
three additional years. The lease also gave the lessee an 
option to purchase the property for 550,000 at the end of 
five years, 537,500 at the end of seven years and 525,000 at 
the end of the eighth year. On July 1, 1947, the taxpayer 
exercised the option and paid the requisite 550,000. The 
Service claimed that this transaction was a conditional 
sale, and, as a consequence, the taxpayer could not deduct 
rent.
The Tax Court (22 TC 1386) applied the economic test 
and concluded that the transaction was a conditional sale. 
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit rejected this conclusion 
after an examination of the concept of conditional sales as 
defined in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. This act 
states that a lease is substantially equivalent to a 
conditional sale if the buyer is bound to pay rent 
approximately equal to the value of the goods and has the 
option of becoming the owner or is to become the owner after 
all cent is paid (Uniform Conditional Sales Act, Sec. 1).
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Because Breece Veneer was required to pay $50,000 before the 
property could be obtained, the Seventh Circuit reasoned 
that the rental payments were not substantially equivalent 
to the plant's value. Consequently, the court held that the 
transaction was a valid lease. Additional indicators of the 
lack of an intent to sell were the reasonable rent charqed 
by BFC and its unsuccessful attempt to sell the property.
To further augment their rationale, the court uniquely 
interpreted Code Section 23(a)(1)(a), the predecessor of 
Code Section 163(a)(3). This section, as previously 
discussed, denies rental deductions if the lessee has an 
equity interest in the property. The court felt it implied 
that a lessee did not have an equity interest until he 
exercised the option. This is because before an option is 
exercised, monthly payments are necessary to continue using 
the property. As a result, Breece Veneer did not acquire 
any equity because payments were necessary for his continued 
use.
This liberal decision can be considered as authority, 
at least in the Seventh Circuit, for reaching a similar 
result. Furthermore, one tax commentator (Schwanbeck, 1961) 
has suggested that the intent test is utilized by the entire 
judiciary, including the Tax Court. nevertheless, the 
Service, through a series of rulings, has placed 
considerable emphasis upon economic factors. These rulings, 
coupled with the predilection of most courts to follow the 
Tax Court's lead in the use of the economic test, would
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place the taxpayer in a very difficult position if he relied 
upon this reasoning. The following section examines the
Service's position.
ADHINISTBATITE STANCE ON DIRECT LEASES
The Service formally expressed its position on the 
difference between conditional sales and direct leases in a 
series of revenue rulings issued in 1955. The major ruling. 
Rev. Bui. 55-540 (1955-2 CB 39), stipulated that each case 
must be examined in the light of its own particular facts in 
order to determine intent at the time the agreement was
executed. Whenever the Service analyzes these facts, it 
will regard a transaction to be a sale if one or more of the 
following conditions are present (Rev. Rul. 55-540}:
a) Portions of the payments specifically apply to an 
equity with the lessee or are specifically designated as
interest.
b) The lessee automatically receives title after he
pays a stated amount of required rentals.
c) The cumulative amount of rent the lessee is 
required to pay over a relatively short period of time is an 
"inordinately large portion" of the sum that would have been 
paid to transfer title.
d) The required payments exceed current fair rental
value.
e) The property may be acquired with a purchase option 
at a price which is nominal in comparison to its expected
fair market value at the time of exercise, or which is small
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in relationship with the aggregate amount of required 
payments.
f) The total lease payments approximate the total
amount the lessee would have paid if he had directly
purchased the property.
These guidelines were applied in a series of rulings in
1955. In the first of these. Hew. Bui. 55-25 (1955-1 CB
283), a trust agreement allowed a taxpayer to lease
automotive equipment from a trust. The trustee had only
bare legal title to the equipment while the taxpayer had all 
rights and obligations of ownership. Rents paid 
approximated the trust's cost plus interest and incidental 
expenses. Moreover, the taxpayer could at any time acquire 
full title to the equipment simply by paying the unpaid
balance. The Service, noting the equality of total rental 
and option payments with the amount the lessee would have 
paid in a sale, held that the transaction was actually a 
sale.
In the second of these rulings. Rev. Rul. 55-542 
(1955-2 CB 59), a lessee contracted to pay S150X in 
quarterly payments over fifteen years for the use of
equipment. Once again, the Service compared total payments 
made by lessee with the payments that would have been made
under a hypothetical sale. It estimated that the equipment
could have been purchased directly for S150X with interest 
of $40X being paid over 15 years for a total payment of
S190X. Under the lease contract, the Service added an
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estimated interest element of $361 to the rentals of S150X 
and option price of $40X to arrive at a total payment under 
the lease contract of $226X. This amount was considered to 
be approximately equal to the total payment of $190X under a 
hypothetical sale. Consequently, the transaction was 
reclassified as a conditional sales contract requirinq the 
quarterly payments to be capitalized to the extent they did 
not represent interest or finance charqes.
The last of this series of rulinqs. Rev. Rul. 55-541 
(1955-2 CB 19), examined a transaction where a lessee 
enjoyed all of the benefits of ownership for substantially 
the entire life of the property. In this rulinq, the owner 
furnished equipment to a lessee for 36 months at fixed 
rental payments. The agreement could be renewed, annually, 
for an aggregate of ten years with all operating expenses 
paid by lessee. Since there was no provision for the lessee 
obtaining legal title, he was required to return the 
property at the end of the lease period (thirteen years if 
all renewal periods were taken). Even so, the Service 
concluded that the lessee was enjoying significant benefits 
for substantially the entire life of the equipment and 
considered the transaction to be a conditional sale.
JUDICIAL REACTION TO THE SERVICE'S POSITION
The series of revenue rulings just discussed did not 
provide the desired certainty of judicial application. This 
is because the judiciary was usually more liberal in the 
analysis of leases than the Service. Specifically, one
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commentator observed that courts tended to consider 
transactions to be sales only if several of the quantitative 
factors listed in Rev. Rul. 55-540 were present (Frank, 
1964). In contrast, Frank believed the Service
automatically reclassifies leases if any of those factors 
were present. This divergence of views was evident with 
several judicial decisions made soon after the promulgation 
of Rev. Bui. 55-540.
In direct contrast to the Service's automatic treatment 
of transactions containing explicit provisions for interest 
as sales, a jury in Norfolk Southern Railway (PS (DC) Va 
(I960)) held such a transaction was a valid lease. The 
judge emphasized in his instructions to the jury that it was 
their responsibility to determine whether a provision for 
interest prevented lease treatment. The jury's decision 
implies that other facts can overcome the inclusion of an 
interest factor, despite the Service's position to the 
contrary.
The Service would also treat a transaction as a sale if 
the lease payments were approximately equal to the amount 
that would have been made if the property had been 
purchased. This requirement would reclassify all contracts 
providing for the application of rental payments against the 
option price. Nonetheless, the presence of this provision 
may not automatically designate that a sale was the parties' 
original intent. Instead, the lessee may originally lease 
property to ascertain if it is satisfactory and then at a
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later date make the decision of whether or not to purchase
it. In this circumstance, intent at the time of contract
was to lease and not to purchase.
The Tax Court has recognized the need for flexibility
by allowing lease treatment in several cases containing this 
provision. For example, in HBSB (30 TC 7U7) a taxpayer 
leased a radio station to determine whether it would be a 
profitable venture. While leasing the station, he
successfully obtained a license from the Federal 
Communication Commission which was necessary to operate the 
station. After it was received, the taxpayer acquired the 
station by reducing the purchase price with rental payments 
previously made. The Tax Court, noting that acquisition of 
the license was not assured at the time of contract, held 
there was no original intent to purchase. Accordingly, it 
did not reclassify the transaction as a sale.
These cases demonstrated that factors identified in 
Bev. Bui. 55-540 do not individually determine the outcome 
of judicial decisions. Instead, judges will weigh all 
factors in their determination of original intent. Ho 
steadfast rule has yet been developed.
ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIOH OH LEVERAGED LEASES 
While the guidelines issued in 1955 provided some 
guidance for taxpayers constructing direct leasing 
transactions, many taxpayers could not ascertain the
Service's position on the addition of third parties acting 
as lessors in leveraged lease transactions. Accordingly, in
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1975 the Service issued two revenue procedures, Bev. Proc. 
75-12 (1975-1 CB 715) and Rev. Proc. 75-28 (1975-1 CB 752) 
which delineate conditions that must be met before an 
advance ruling can be obtained. One commentator has 
suggested that these guidelines will probably be applied to 
direct leases even though they were geared toward leveraged 
leases (Berlin, 1975). These guidelines are discussed 
below.
Minimum Investment Requirement
The lessor must have a minimum unconditional investment 
of twenty percent in the total acquisition cost of the 
property (Bev. Proc. 75-12 Sec. 4(1)). This must be in 
the form of an equity investment of actual consideration 
paid or personal liability incurred by the lessor. He must 
also be able to demonstrate that he has sufficient net worth 
to satisfy this liability by submitting financial data in 
the ruling request.
Residual Value and Useful Life
Rev. Proc. 75-12 also requires leased property to have 
a reasonably estimated fair market value at the end of the 
initial lease term equal to at least twenty percent of 
original cost. The residual value must be estimated at the 
time of contract without taking into consideration 
inflation, deflation, or any cost of removal and delivery of 
the property back to the lessor. This appears to be a very 
demanding requirement because an estimate of the residual
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value ten or fifteen years into the future is extceiely 
difficult, and is often little more than an educated guess. 
In addition to this stringent provision, Bev. Proc. 75-12 
stipulates that the remaining useful life at the end of the 
lease term must be the greater of one year or twenty percent 
of the originally estimated useful life. As a result, this 
revenue procedure appears to place an unreasonable burden 
upon the leasing parties.
Purchase Optons
In an attempt to ensure that the lessor retained risks 
of ownership, the Service held that purchase options can 
only be based on the fair market value existing at the date 
of exercise (Rev. Proc. 75-12 Sec. 4(2)). Consequently, 
fixed dollar purchase options are not allowed. This rigid
position is contrary to judicial positions in both intent
and economic tests. Generally, fixed purchase options have
been allowed if they approximate the fair market value at
the end of the term estimated at the execution of the 
contract. Only when the purchase option price was low in 
comparison to the estimated fair market value would courts 
tend to classify transactions as conditional sales. The 
judiciary and even the Service in Bev. Rul. 55-540 have 
looked at the facts existing at the time the contract was 
made to determine the intent of the parties. How, the 
Service is requiring the purchase option to be equivalent to 
the exact fair market value on the date of exercise. This 
requirement appears to be extremely arbitrary and may not
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hold up under judicial scrutiny.
Any provisions in the lease agreement requiring the 
lessee to purchase the property at the end of the rental 
period were expressly prohibited by this procedure. These 
arrangements, known as puts, are attempts by lessors to lock 
in their profit which in most instances will be derived from 
the property's salvage value. The Service views this as 
transferring the risks of ownership to the lessee. 
Nevertheless, these guidelines do not appear to prohibit the 
lessor from entering into an agreement with a party totally 
unrelated to the leasing tranaction.
Profit Requirement
The lessor must demonstrate that a profit will be 
generated exclusive of any tax benefit, otherwise, ' the 
economic reality of ownership would be severely weakened.
Oneven Rent
The Service maintained that uneven rents often distort 
the lessor's income on an annual basis. Even so, several 
safe-haven criteria for uneven rents have been provided for 
in circumstances where it was felt a distortion of income 
would not occur. Specifically, the Service will not 
challenge a rent payment schedule if one of the following 
safe-habor rules is satisfied (Rev. Proc. 75*12 Sec. 4.08):
1) The annual rental payments for each year are within 
10% of the average rental payment. This average is computed 
by dividing the total rental payments by the number of years
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in the lease term.
2) During the initial portion of the lease term,
annual rents are always within 10% of the average rental for 
that initial term. The initial lease portion is at least 
two-thirds of the entire lease term. Additionally, annual 
rent for any year during the remainder of the lease must 
not be greater than the highest annual rent in the initial 
lease period and also not less than fifty percent of the 
initial periods* average rent. If these safe-haven criteria 
are not satisfied, uneven rentals may be allowed if there is 
a valid business reason for their fluctuation.
&i»iled Use Property
An additional factor was added by the Service in Bev. 
Proc. 76-30 (1976-2 CB 647). That is, the Service will not 
issue advance rulings for leases of limited use property. 
This is property that is not expected to be useful to the 
lessor at the end of the lease term except through its 
continued renting to the lessee.
SOHHABT
In analyzing these revenue procedures, it must be 
remembered that they were not intended to legally identify 
situations where a lease exists, but merely to describe the 
circumstances when an advance ruling would be available. 
Taxpayers must consider these factors as well as judicial 
criteria in the construction of leasing transactions even 
though they do not have the same legal force.
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Two administrative guidelines generated in fiev. Proc. 
75-12 seem to run contrary to accepted case lav. The 
provisions requiring purchase options to equal fair market 
value existing at the date of exercise and residual values 
to be accurately predicted at the time of the contract 
appear to be too strict. This is because courts have held 
that intent of the parties is to be determined in light of 
facts existing at the time of the original transaction. 
This study will attempt to reduce the uncertainty caused by 
this complex situation by empirically identifying 
quantitative factors utilized by the judiciary. Yet before 
this is done, the conclusions of previous lease studies are 
analyzed.
40
CHAPTER III 
SELECTED LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to review past 
literature concerning proper tax classification of lease 
transactions. Because the majority of these articles are 
qualitative comparisons of guidelines established by the 
Service and various judicial forums, their approach is very 
different from the methodology that was used in this study. 
Even so, their analysis was useful in several ways. First, 
they constituted an excellent source for identifying factors 
crucial in the distinction between sales and leases. 
Additionally, they provided insight into development of 
judicial and administrative guidelines, particularly the 
relationship between the Service and the courts.
Since most of these studies followed a similar pattern, 
this section is not intended to be a complete literature 
search. Instead, it will summarize the major 
interpretations and point out any differences of opinion.
Johnson
The year before the Service anounced its positiion on 
leases in Bev. Rul. 55-540, Johnson (1954) critically 
analyzed the economic and intent tests developed by the
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judiciary. By comparing then to the basic tax objectives of 
equity, certainty, and administrative ease, he concluded 
that both had severe shortcomings. Specifically, the 
economic test developed by the Tax Court had been expressed 
in so many different ways that Johnson decided it was of 
little help to taxpayers. Though it may at first have 
appeared to be an objective test based on economic factors, 
Johnson found this appearance to be deceiving. Objective 
tests provide certainty of application only if they are 
stated with clarity. Even after allowing for the difficulty 
inherent in devising a rule for the ambiguous and complex 
lease versus sale issue, Johnson decided that the necessary 
precision was absent. He concluded that the economic test 
did not at that time constitute a clear guide.
The more subjective intent test fared even worse. 
Despite the fact that it might be fairer than the economic 
test because of its flexibility, Johnson felt endless 
litigation and controversy would result if it were used. 
Introduction of noneconomic factors increases uncertainty 
since taxpayers would not know in advance what factors the 
courts would consider important. Relevant indicators of 
intent would change with each case, preventing taxpayers 
from relying upon judicial precedence. Johnson considered 
this an unsatisfactory situation.
Since neither of these tests were suitable, Johnson 
proposed several modifications to achieve the requisite 
certainty. With respect to the economic test, he believed
U2
it was basically an analysis of two factors: excessive rent
and nominal purchase option. Greater simplicity and clarity 
could be introduced if the courts realized this and restated 
the test accordingly. Johnson proposed the following 
approach:
1) If rental payments do not exceed fair market 
rental, the transaction is a lease.
2) If rental charges exceed fair rental value but 
the option price is equal to expected fair 
market value, the transaction is a lease.
3) In all other cases, the transaction is a sale.
Johnson suggested that this method would achieve the desired 
certainty of application while still staying within the 
framework developed by the Tax Court.
Alternatively, the intent test could be restructured so 
that the transaction's original form would be the sole 
criteria indicating the parties' intent. That is, 
transactions would be taxed in accordance with the form 
designed by the lessee and lessor, without any interference 
from the Service or judiciary. Since no transaction would 
be reclassified, the goals of certainty and administrative 
ease could be achieved. However, this would probably open 
the door to substantial tax abuse. Taxpayers could 
artificially determine the tax outcome of the transaction 
simply by designating its form, making leases an effective
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avenue for tax avoidance. Due to the possibility of abuse,
Johnson did not consider this modification of the intent
test to be realistic.
Alternative Approach. Johnson reasoned that neither of 
these tests «ere totally satisfactory because they
classified transactions as sales or leases without providing 
a third alternative. He felt this could cause absurd 
results by taxing a transaction as a sale even if the option 
was never exercised and the lessee never became owner.
Insistence on classifying a transaction as either a sale or 
a lease ignored, he maintained, the fact that most 
transactions have elements of both leases and sales. 
Johnson believed this dual nature must be recognized in the 
determination of proper tax treatment.
To implement this concept, he suggested that all option 
agreements should be treated as sales unless title passed 
only upon payment of a substantial option price. In those 
circumstances, a transaction would receive dual treatment. 
That is, both the lessor and lessee would treat the payments 
as rent to the extent of fair market rental,with any excess 
considered as a partial payment on the purchase price. This 
would require the transaction to be left open until the cost 
basis of the lessor was exceeded by the purchase payments. 
At that point, the lessor would recognize a sale. Whenever 
the option was exercised, the transaction would be treated 
as a sale by both parties. If it was never recognized, the 
lessee would incur a loss in the year the option expired to
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the extent of his excess payments.
Since this method took into account the dual nature of 
lease-purchase agreements, Johnson believed it recognized 
the economic essence of the transaction. Furthermore, it 
would be relatively easy to administer, since transactions 
would be left open to let future events determine the 
appropriate tax treatment. Consequently, there would be no 
need for judicial and administrative identification of 
original intent. Despite these advantages, this
recommendation received little attention in the tax 
literature.
Silk
Silk (1964) noticed that the judiciary appeared to be 
more lenient than the Service in several of its decisions 
after the issuance of Rev. Rul. 55-540. He believed this 
discrepancy resulted from different approaches being taken 
by these two branches of government. To provide a 
foundation for his analysis. Silk developed a framework to 
explain basic lease relationships. In so doing, he
concluded that taxpayers are motivated to lease property 
instead of purchasing it because of differences in allowable 
deductions for rent and depreciation. In many 
circumstances, the amount an individual can deduct as rent 
exceeds the amount of depreciation that would be available
if he had purchased the property. In a lease-option
transaction, a lessee has advantages of larger rental 
deductions resulting from the lease aspect of the agreement
1*5
in additisn to potential benefits of ownership through 
exercise of the option clause.
In return, a lessor determines his rental charges in 
order to recoup his cost, profit, and an additional interest 
charge from the lessee before the property worthless. To 
serve as a cushion against future decreases in value, the 
rent charged during a period often exceeds the asset's 
decline in market value. Silk calls this difference between 
total rents received and decline in the asset's fair market 
value the reserve factor. The amount the lessor will charge 
to enable him to recover his cost, profit, and interest 
during the term of the lease gives rise to a normal reserve 
factor. However, an excessive reserve factor often occurs 
if the rental period is significantly less than the asset's 
useful life. Because the lessor would then have to rerent 
or sell the property in order to have a profit, he usually 
charges a higher rent. With higher rental charges, payments 
will exceed declines in market value to an even greater 
degree, causing a higher reserve factor. à higher reserve 
factor, enables the lessor to recoupe more of his cost and 
desired profit from the lease transaction. This allows him 
demand a smaller option payment, which could easily be below 
the asset's fair market value. Silk called the difference 
between the option price and value the equity factor.
After examining the provisions of Bev. Bui. 55-540, he 
concluded that the Service treates contracts whose option 
price is below the assets* market value as purchases. Or
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when, in terms of his analysis, the lessee has an equity 
factor. in contrast, he maintained that the judiciary 
tolerated a normal equity and reserve factor,and will 
reclassify a transaction only if they are excessive. In 
other words, courts allow options to be below market values 
until the difference becomes too great, while the Service 
reclassifies transactions whenever option prices are below 
expectedvalues. He suggested the court's tolerance may 
reflect a subconscience desire to aid taxpayers who are not 
overly agressive in obtaining the tax advantages of leases.
Schwanbeck
Schwanbeck (1968) compared the lease capitalization 
requirements of APB No. 5 with those developed by the 
judiciary and Service. Hhile APB Opinion No. 5 dealt solely 
with two economic relationships, Schwanbeck believed that 
the judiciary and Service did not limit thenselves to these 
factors but also considered other, more subjective criteria, 
both economic and noneconomic in nature. To illustrate this 
difference, he compared and contrasted the two factors in 
APB No. 5 to others he considered important in the judicial 
and administrative distinction between sales and leases.
The first provision of APB No. 5 prohibited lease 
treatment for transactions containing nominal renewal 
options. Despite the importance of this factor, neither the 
APB, Service, nor judiciary had specified what constituted 
"nominal". Instead, each group had examined the renewal 
option in light of facts and circumstances peculiar to its
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lease contract. Though Schwanbeck agreed that no arbitrary 
formula could be derived to define "nominal", he did 
advocate an approach taxpayers could use to indicate whether 
the renewal rate was too low. This was done by comparing an 
asset's expected value with the present value of the rental 
payments during the renewal period. He believed that 
renewal options were nominal if the present value of the 
rental payments was less than anticipated value. If the two 
amounts were approximately equal, the renewal rate could be 
considered appropriate.
To operationalize this concept, Schwanbeck suggested 
that undepreciated cost at the end of the initial term could 
be used to approximate future expected value. Conceding 
that undepreciated cost is no indication of value, he still 
argued it may be a reasonable approximation of value ten or 
fifteen years into the future. This relationship may have 
been true when Schwanbeck wrote the article in 1968, a 
period of relatively little inflation. However, changes in 
the economy resulting from sustained inflation may have 
destroyed any connection between decline in value and 
accumulated depreciation. Conseguenlty, Schwanbeck's 
reliance on undepreciated cost may not be warranted in 
today's economic environment.
Regarding ip3 Mo. 5's second provision prohibiting 
bargain purchase options, Schwanbeck cautioned that care 
should be taken in determining whether an option is a 
bargain. He avered that clauses allowing lessees to reduce
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their purchase prices with rents ready paid should not 
automatically receive sale treatment. Though these 
provisions are strong evidence that the parties intended to 
create a sale, Schwanbeck argued that they can indicate an 
intention to lease if the rents were reasonable and the 
option price reflected the expected decline in value. Once 
again, Schwanbeck argued, all facts of case, including those 
noneconomic in nature, must be taken into consideration.
Schwanbeck maintained that the entire judiciary 
utilized the intent test, and used economic factors as only 
part of the criteria in determining original intent. This 
position was based on the fact that the Service was reversed 
in several judicial decisions. Basically, he believed that 
the judiciary considered not only factors listed in Rev. 
Rul. 55-540, but also other, more subjective indicators of 
original intent. These nonneconomic criteria included 
whether or not property was manufactured specifically for 
the lessee, which party assumed the risk of loss, whether 
the lessor could remove property at the end of the lease 
term, or if the lessee's costs of removing the property are 
substantial in comparison with the rental under the renewal 
option. Since the intent test is used, all surrounding 
facts and circumstances must be considered. Thus,
Schwanbeck concluded there can be no hard and fast rule in 
differentiating between sales and leases.
Bitker ^ d  Neiniko^
Bitker and Beinikoff (1979) examined lease litigation
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to identify factors that determine when a transaction can be 
restructured for tax purposes. Since both authors ace 
lawyers, their approach was somewhat different from that 
taken by other commentators discussed in this chapter. 
While most of the articles in this area focused upon the 
criteria the Service and courts use to determine whether a 
transaction should be reclassified, this paper also examined 
issues dealing with the legal process, such as the parole 
evidence rule.
Before these issues were examined, the authors compared 
the economic and intent tests developed by the judiciary. 
In sharp contrast to Schwanbeck, they believed the total 
judiciary used the economic test despite the fact that some 
courts have preferred to search for the intent rather than 
the simply follow the Service's rulings. They suggested 
that any objection was confined to Rev. Rul. 55-540's 
arithmetic ratios, rather than to the factors it delineated. 
This is because Rev Rul. 55-540 was "distilled from prior 
case law rather than an imaginative revenue agent." 
Consequently, they felt taxpayers should be able to rely 
upon the economic factors listed in Rev. Rul. 55-540 in 
structuring their lease transactions.
After this examination of judicial tests, Bitker and 
Neinikoff sought to determine whether the lessor or lessee 
could attempt to restructure a transaction even if the 
Service was content to accept it in its present form. In 
other words, can taxpayers invoke the doctrine of substance
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over form, or are they stuck with their original 
designation? The authors noted that some courts have 
permitted taxpayers to invoke this doctrine as freely as the 
Service, while others have refused to listen to taxpayers' 
pleas. Even so, they were of the opinion that most courts 
allow taxpayers to change their transactions' form in order 
to make it conform to its substance. This tolerance may 
result from the belief that the tax treatment should not 
depend on the labels originally used but that the substance 
should govern.
Focusing on another issue, the authors noted that the 
parties may receive different tax treatment if their cases 
were tried separately. Since each taxpayer has the burden 
of proof, one party might be more convincing in his 
arguments than the other. This is especially true if the 
cases are being tried in differrent judicial forums. While 
the lack of consistency is disturbing, the authors could not 
identify any enforceable safeguard against inconsistent 
treatment.
In as much as the Service and judiciary rarely consider 
prior oral agreements in their reclassification decision, 
the authors concluded that the parole evidence rule was not 
applicable to the lease versus sale issue. Nonetheless, if 
courts reclassify a lease, they may determine the 
appropriate sale price by referring to prior unsuccessful 
sale attempts.
Berlin
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Berlin’s article «as written shortly after the Service 
anounced it position on leveraged leases in fiev. Procs. 
75-12 and 75-28. After reviewing these new requirements, 
Berlin concluded they should help eliminate the lack of 
consistency previously existing for leases in both tax and 
financial accounting. For example, he viewed the doubling 
of percentage requirements for the asset's remaining useful 
life from the informal rules of ten percent an indication of 
the Service's desire to come closer to the positions 
previously taken by the FASB and SEC. Nonetheless, he 
observed that the Service's requirements were more stringent 
that those developed by the judiciary. Specifically, Bev. 
Proc. 75-12 stipulated that lease option prices must be 
exactly equal to market values at the time of exercise. 
This in essence proscribed the use of fixed options because 
prices determined at the beginning of lease terms would 
rarely equal market values at the time of exercise. Op 
until this time,Berlin noted, the judiciary had allowed 
options to appoximate the expected fair market value. If 
the option price was a reasonable approximation of the 
asset's future value, courts would generally not reclassify 
the lease transaction. Accordingly, Berlin concluded that 
this new provision went beyond the judicial criteria 
regarding options.
Berlin believed that the Service's more stringent 
position arose from a desire to insure that the economic 
risks of ownership would not be transferred from the lessor
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to the lessee. However, in as much as the lessor is forced
to assume more of the risks of ownership, the costs of of 
leveragedleases has increased, which may have harmful 
effects on the the economy.
Enqlebrecht and Holfe
Englebrecht and Roife (1981) traced the development of 
judicial and administrative stances ir order to identify 
relevent factors in the classification of transactions as 
sales or leases. The factors they identified are depicted 
in Figure 3-1. The figure also contrasts those factors 
against the safe-harbor rules enacted in the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The authors believed that these 
new rules placed corporate lessors in a strong competitive 
position. Since tax benefits from the leasing transaction 
could be utilized in determining the existence of a profit 
motive for a corporate lessor and there was no reguirement 
for a lease option to approximate fair market value, 
corporate lessors could charge less rent than noncorporate 
lessors.
- • • f i g u r e 3-1
Englebrecht and Rolfe's Summary nf Qualifvine Criteria for Leases
^  __  Tax C o n seq u en ces
Pertinent Crlterta^^
E xistence In 
th e  T ransaction
Tax C laaslflcatlon 
lo r T ransaction  
NOT Oualllytng for 
Safe Harbor Rules
Tax C lassification 
for T ransaction  
Qualifying for 
Safe Harbor R ules
Yea No L ease Sale L ease  Sale
1. Lessor has minimum continuous at risk 
amount ol 20 percent of the equipment's cost.
X
X
X
X
X
a
2. Twenty percent of the useful life and original 
value are expected to remain after lease term.
X
X
X
X
X
X
3 Purchase option approximates expected fair 
market value of equipment at exercise date
X
X
X
X
X
X
4. Lessee furnishes funds to lessor. X
X X
X
X
a
X
5. Profit to lessor apart from tax benefits. X
X
X
X
X
X"
6 Unevenness of rent exceeds allowable amounts X
X X
X X
X
7. Portions of the payments m ade by lessee 
specifically apply to equity.
X
X X
X X
X
8. Lessee automatically receives title after 
payment of a  specific amount of rent.
X
X
X
X
X
X
9. Rent is higher than fair market rent. X
X X
X X '
X
10. A large portion of the cost of the equipment 
equals the payments required to be made 
in a  short time.
X
X X
X X
■ X
11. Total payments plus the option price 
approximate the cost that the lessee 
could have purchased the equipment tor 
plus an interest element.
X
X X
X X
X
12. Property is not expected to be useful 
to the lessor at end of lease term except 
through continued leasing to lessee.
X
X X
X X
X
a. Only 10 percent of the a s se t needs to be  at risk under the sa te  harbor rules.
b. Tax trenefits may t>e included a s  the lessor evaluates profitability.
c. The rental payments will probably t>e below the fair rental amount.
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Nonetheless, the authors concluded that until Congress 
recognizes this inequity, noncorporate lessors must abide by 
the more stringent guidelines depicted in Figure 3-1.
SOMa&BY
These articles demonstrate that no consistent guide had 
yet been identified to distinguish between sales and leases. 
Taxpayers did not know whether only economic factors 
determine the case's outcome, as suggested by Bitker and 
Neinikoff, or whether noneconomic factors are also 
considered, as proposed by Schwanbeck. Moreover, even when 
there is agreement on the significance of a particular 
variable, there is often no consensus as to its 
interpretation. For example, each of these articles 
stressed the importance of the relationship between option 
price and expected fair market value. Even so, there was no 
agreement as to the amount an option price can be below the 
asset's value before the transaction should be regarded as a 
sale. While the Service maintains the relationship should 
be exactly equal, the judiciary appears to accept an 
approximate relationship, or at the very minimum, an option 
that is not nominal. Since, no guidelines are provided to 
depict when an option price is satisfactory, taxpayers are 
left with a great deal of uncertainty.
This study seeks to fill this void by systematically 
analyzing lease versus sale cases to determine the factors, 
both economic and noneconomic, that can explain judicial 
decisions. The methodology that was employed not only was
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able to identify the crucial variables, but also could 
interpret their iepact upon the judicial process. The next 
chapter examines in detail the techniques that were 
employed.
56
CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY
Logit analysis vas the statistical procedure used to 
examine the data in this study. The primary purpose of this 
chapter is to discuss the theory and application of this 
technique. Additionally, to support the use of quantitative 
techniques over the more widely used descriptive approach, 
results of previous empirical tax studies are examined and 
contrasted. The procedures used to verify and interpret 
the statistical models are also discussed.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN TAXATION
Previous Studies Using Regression Analysis
Much tax research consists of qualitative descriptive 
analyses of cases to identify key factors inherent in 
judicial decisions. This approach is useful when the issue 
is straightforward, with relatively few variables affecting 
the judicial decision making process. However, the 
increasing complexity involved in more intricate tax issues 
reduces the usefulness of such analysis. That is, when 
cases are decided only by assessing multiple and interactive 
variables, the effectiveness of relying on specific 
precedents is reduced since precedent cases will rarely
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correspond closely enough to the current fact situation. 
Quantitative research techniques may be able to identify 
variables and patterns which would escape detection by 
qualitative methods because these techniques incorporate and 
synthesize patterns developed in separate cases.
Kort's Study. One of the first applications of quantitative 
analytical techniques to legal issues was Kort's 1957 stndy 
of the United States Supreme Court's right to counsel 
decisions. Kort hypothesized that the Supreme Court would 
not overrule a state court's decision unless there was more 
than one factor indicating the defendant had received an 
unfair trial. To test this theory, numerical values were 
assigned to qualitative factors mentioned in the decisions 
in order to calculate a score for each case. A critical 
score for an affirmative vote was determined by comparing 
the scores of cases that had been overruled with those that 
had not. Using this critical score, Kort correctly 
classified all fourteen cases in his hold out sample. The 
high degree of accuracy Kort achieved in this study and in a 
follow up study in 1963 using factor analysis and multiple 
regression are impressive, not only because they validated 
Kort's theory, but also because he did not have any
statistical computer programs at his disposal. Obviously, 
the recent creation of computer packages has greatly
facilitated this type of research.
Enqlebrecht's Study. Englebrecht (1976) used multiple
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regression to examine the Tax Court's valuation process of 
closely held stock. He concluded that guidelines 
established by the Internal Revenue Code, Treasury 
Regulations, and Revenue Rulings jointly explained 86.5% of 
the Tax Court's valuations. A closer analysis revealed that 
court determined values were within ten percent of the 
stock's book value. Additionally, a simple regression model 
consisting of only the midpoint between the Service's and 
taxpayers' claimed values explained 97% of the valuations. 
If the judiciary uses compromise values instead of the 
requisite valuation principles, taxpayers and the Service 
could have a direct impact upon the courts* valuations by 
artificially stating their original appraisals. 
Accordingly, Bosland (1963) stated that this situation 
defeats justice. A followup study by Englebrecht and 
Jamison (1979) revealed that compromise values only 
explained nine percent of the Tax Court's determined values 
of charitable contributions. As a result, taxpayers and the 
Service should not be able to artificially influence the Tax 
Court's decision with respect to this income tax issue.
Boyd's Study. Another examination of Tax Court decisions 
with regression analysis was Boyd's (1977) study of the 
judicial determination of reasonable compensation in closely 
held corporations. His regression model consisting of the 
guidelines established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hayson 
Manufacturing explained 87.1% of the variance in the 75 
cases analyzed.
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Kramer's Study. Regression analysis was also used by Kramer 
(1982) to investigate the valuation of large blocks of 
stock. Onlike the previous two studies, there were no 
legislative or administrative guidelines already developed 
in this area. Therefore, variables included in the analysis 
could only be identified through a search of the literature 
and relevant judicial decisions. These variables only 
accounted for 67% of the variance in Tax Court valuations, 
an amount lower than that obtained by both Boyd and 
Englebrecht. Less variance may have been explained because 
Kramer was attempting to identify variables that had not 
been formally delineated by the Service or judiciary while 
Englebrecht and Boyd sought to determing whether the 
judiciary was using established guidelines.
Previous Studies Osing Discriminant Analysis
Since regression analysis assumes the dependent 
variable is continuous, it is applicable in the analysis of 
valuation decisions. However, it may not be appropriate in 
other areas of taxation where the dependent variable is 
binary. That is, the judicial decisions are either for or 
against the taxpayers. In these circumstances, discriminant 
analysis has often been used.. For example. Bond (1977) used 
both linear and nonlinear discriminant analysis to determine 
how the Tax Court classifies as debt or equity funds 
provided by owners of corporations. The variables 
identified in the linear analysis misclassified only six of 
the ninety-six cases in the original sample and one out of
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eight in the hold out sample. The quadratic analysis did 
not improve upon the accuracy of the linear model.
Another application of discriminant analysis was 
Hadeo's 1979 study of the accumulated earnings tax. A
discriminant function based on the IBS' audit manual was
found to be more accurate than one based on the treasury 
regulations. She concluded this might give an unfair
advantage to the Service since all taxpayers do not have 
access to audit guidelines.
Assumptions of Discriminant Analvsis
Each of these studies revealed patterns or variables 
undetected and/or unproven by descriptive techniques. Given 
the complexity of the leasing issue and the success of 
previous researchers, cases involving leases were analyzed 
quantitatively with statistical methods. However, before
discriminant analysis can be used, two critical assumptions 
must be net: the independent variables must observe a
multivariate normal distribution and the group dispersion 
matrices must be equal across all groups (Eisenbeis (1977) 
p. 875). Because these assumptions are violated when some 
of the independent variables are discrete, discriminant 
analysis should only be utilized if its classification and 
prediction abilities are not materially affected by these 
violations.
Currently, the robustness of the multinormality 
assumption is unclear. Some early studies appeared to show 
that the classification ability of discriminant analysis is
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not seriously affected. For example, Gilbert (1968) 
compared the performance of a linear discriminant function 
consisting of discrete variables with the performance of two 
logit models and concluded the loss of precision using the 
linear function was small. Krazanowski (1975) further 
substantiated this with his analysis of discriminant 
analysis using both binary and continuous variables. 
Despite these studies, recent research has cast a shadow 
over discriminant analysis' robustness with respect to this 
assumption. Pinches (1980) has stated it is much more 
important than most applied researchers have previously 
realized. Eisenbeis (1977) agrees, and maintains that 
violations bias the tests for significance and estimation of 
the error rates. Furthermore, whenever the independent 
variables are not mnltinormally distributed, group 
dispersion matrices are seldom equal (Pinches, 1980).
The second assumption of homogeneity of dispersion 
matrices is critical for the use of discriminant analysis 
(Bisenbies and Avery, 1975). If the group dispersion 
matrices are not equal, the classification rules and 
significance tests for the difference in group means could 
be seriously affected. For example, Cooley and Lohnes 
(1971, p. 267) have determined that in groups with equal 
probabilities of group membership the group with the larger 
dispersion will tend to have more cases assigned to it.
Fienberg (1980) noted that the use of statistical 
estimates developed from a discriminant analysis will not be
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consistent if the basic assumptions are violated. He has 
suggested that in these circumstances logistic analysis may 
be superior to discriminant analysis because it does not 
have the same basic assumptions. Moreover, the basic 
logistic relationship seems to be more realistic than that 
of linear discriminant analysis. This is because linear 
relationships say not be appropriate if the presence of one 
factor, such as a nominal purchase option price, makes a 
particular decision inevitable. In these circumstances, 
variations of other variables would have little impact upon 
the decision. However, if that variable were not as 
pronounced, as when the option price approximated the 
expected fair market value, variation of the other variables 
may be significant. This interaction effect cannot be 
incorporated into discriminant analysis but can be in the 
cumulative logistic function (Pindyck and Pubinfeld, 1931).
FIGURE h-1
Comparison of Linear and Cumulative Logistic Functions
a)Linear Function Cumulative Logistict)
Figure U-1 contrasts the cumulative logistic function.
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the underlying relationship for logit, with a linear 
association. The cumulative logistic function has a tilted 
S association in that there are no uniform increases in the 
probabilities of a particular decision as the independent 
variable increases, as occurs in linear relationships. 
Instead, the independent variable has its greatest impact at 
the midpoint of its distribution, where the slope is the 
steepest. Near the endpoints of the distribution, large 
changes are needed to have a significant impact upon the 
dependent variable.
Since logit does not have the restrictive assumptions 
of discriminant analysis and observes a more realistic 
association between dependent and independent variables, it 
was used to analyze the data in this study.
isajt
Logit analysis constitutes one category of a broad 
group of statistical analysis known as log linear analysis. 
Whereas logit analysis focuses on the underlying 
relationship between known independent and dependent 
variables, ordinary log linear analysis does not specify any 
variable as dependent but examines all associations. 
Essentially, log linear models attempt to explain 
differences between observed and expected frequencies but 
bypasses the frequencies themselves by focusing on the odds 
related to various associations. These odds are the chance 
that a randomly selected observation will fall into one 
category as opposed to another. Even more specifically, log
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linear aoiels concentrate upon conditional odds, the chances 
of choosing an alternative given knowledge of its group 
membership. A useful variation of such conditional odds is 
the log odds ratio, simply a ratio of conditional odds. If 
the variables are mot associated, the conditional odds will 
be egnal (i.e., the odds ratio is 1). A ratio greater than 
one signifies direct covariation while a ratio less than one 
represents a negative relationship. The following example 
illustrates the usefulness of conditional odds.
A crosstabulation of race and support for a 
hypothetical candidate is depicted in Figure 4-2. The odds 
that an individual would support this candidate is 
1900/1500. The odds of black individuals supporting 
Candidate A is 400/900 or .44 while the conditional odds of 
white voters supporting him is 1500/600 or 2.5. This means 
that the odds of whites supporting the candidate are 
approximately 5.7 times higher than that of blacks 
indicating there is a positive relationship between support 
and race. Accordingly, knowledge of an individual's race is 
useful in predicting political support.
Though the odds ratio is useful in determining 
relationships, it is based on the multiplicative model 
depicted in equation 1.
V m
(1) Xij=nT^T.
where
is the expected cell frequency;
n is the geometric mean of the number of cases in each 
cell
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FIG U R F, 6 - 9 .
CrosstabulatioD of Race and Support 
for Candidate A
Race
Support
Black White
Yes 400 1500 fi = 1900
No 900 600 fg = 1500
f.2 = 1300 f.2 = 2100
6 6
Tj is the effect which factor V has on ceil frequency;
and
■j is a function of product of two conditional odds. 
Since multiplicative models are very difficult to 
manipulate, a logarithmic transformation is taken to 
transform the equation into a more manageable additive 
function (Knoke and Burke, 1980).
(2) in Xij=ln{n ) *ln ( v ) ^In { t™)
By letting 0 = l n ( n )  we get
(3) In X .^^U + Uii+U^j
S i n c e  In e =0, we can restate equation 3 as
(4) In X^.=ln e +ln e +lu
Logit analysis assesses the effects of independent 
variables upon the dependent variable by examining the 
exponents of equation (4) which are analagous to regression 
coefficients. The basic principles of logit can be easily 
demonstrated with the cumulative logistic function, the 
distribution upon which it is based (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld,1981)
(5) Pj. j ^ \  -(c + SX.,-
where
P is the probability that an individual will make a 
certain choice, given X .
This equation can be simplified in the following steps:
6) (1 + e - ( * +  . 1
7) (1 + e " 1/Pi
8) e = 1/Pi-l
9) = U -PiW Pi
10) . -< ”  
By taking the natural logarithm of both sides of equation
(10) me obtain
11) a + ex^ = In  ( 7 ^ )
This is the logit model. The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the odds that a particular choice mill be made. 
Unlike a probability function, log odds ratios are not 
constrained betmeen zero and one but can occur anyvhere on 
the positive real line.
Logit analysis attempts to explain variations in the 
dependent variable by estimating the parameters of the logit 
function. & model that explains all effects of the 
dependent variable is referred to as saturated. In this 
model, all variance is accounted for because a separate 
parameter is calculated for each possible combination of 
variables. While everything is explained, the function 
would be too large to effectively interpret. on the other 
hand, nonsaturated models do not totally explain all 
variance but are small enough to easily interpret. These 
models use a hierarchical rule to indicate the highest order 
effect parameters to be included. Bio fledical Computer 
Programs (1979), the statistical package used in this study, 
considers an interaction for possible entry into the 
function only if all lomer-order interactions and main 
effects have already been entered into the model.
The best fitting logit model can be estimated with a 
forward or backward step-wise procedure. A backward process 
starts with a saturated model and then eliminates 
superfluous terms. This may be very time consuming since
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the saturated model could be very large. A forward step­
wise procedure takes the opposite approach by first 
estimating a constant and then entering terms one at a time 
until no significant improvement can be made on the 
explanatory ability of the model. Knoke and Burke (1980) 
recommend the use of a forward procedure because it is more 
parsimonious.
The fit of each model developed in the step-wise 
procedure is determined by calculating the decrease in the 
chi-squared statistic. While the focus upon the decrease 
may appear to be contrary to the strategy utilized in the 
chi-square test, there is actually no conflict. This is
because the basic objectives are different. In the
traditional chi-square test, independence of the variables 
is being determined by testing the null hypothesis that no 
association exits among the variables. This hypothesis can 
only be rejected by finding a high chi-square statistic. In 
contrast, logit analysis attempts to explain the basic 
underlying relationship by estimating an additive function. 
A good model would classify observations in a manner similar 
to that found in the observed groupings. If the
relationship between expected and observed classifications 
is close, the chi-square would then be low. This step-wise 
procedure continues until there is no further significant 
decrease in the chi-square statistic.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation. The analysis described 
relates to the general logit model consisting of categorical
69
independent variables with a large enough sample size to 
provide members for all possible combinations of variables. 
For studies with continuous as well as categorical 
independent variables and/or small samples, modifications 
are made to this basic procedure. Specifically, this is 
done by estimating the model with maximum likelihood 
estimation techniques (Pindyck and Bubinfeld, 1981). This 
method is appropriate because a unique maximum always exists 
for a logit model. Moreover, it overcomes the necessity of 
grouping variables by assigning a distinct probability to 
each individual observation. Since data does not need to be 
grouped, continuous variables can be used.
To accomplish this, information is provided for the 
particular decision(Ti) made for each observation. In order 
to find a pattern for these observations, maximum likelihood 
methods estimate the parameters ot and 3. This process is 
started by constructing a maximum-likelihood function. If 
m  cases are held to be leases and N2 cases sales, the 
likelihood function would have the following form (Pindyck 
and Bubinfeld, 1981):
12) t=Prob (ïi,Ï2) where
Y1 represents a transaction classified as a lease and
T2 represents a transaction classified as a sale. 
Maximum likelihood techniques assume that observations are 
independent so that P(YiA Y g) is equal to P(Yi) PCYa). This 
allows (12) to be restated as
13) L=Prob (Yi)*Prob (Yg)
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Since the probability that a transaction is a lease is 
equal to one minus the probability that a transaction is a 
sale, equation (13) can be reduced to
U J  L = P ^ ( 1 - P j )
Because logarithms are easier to manipulate, a 
logarithmic transformation is taken of equation (14).
15) log l=log Pj +log (l-P^  )
Estimations of a and 6 can be calculated by 
differentiating (13) with respect to a and 3 •
SCflBABÏ
Statistical methods have been very successful in 
identifying crucial factors in complicated tax situations. 
One of these techniques, discriminant analysis, has been 
used to analyze cases whose decisions are binary in nature. 
Nevertheless, it has two assumptions that must be met: the
variables must follow a multinormal distribution and the 
dispersion matrices should be equal. Recent research has 
shown that discriminant analysis* results are very sensitive 
to their violation. Since both are not met by the data in 
this study, discriminant analysis was not used. However, 
another statistical procedure, logit analysis, can analyze 
binary decisions without the need of these assumptions. As 
a result, it was used to examine lease litigation. The next 
chapter presents the results of this analysis.
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CHAPTER 7 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the 
independent variables used in this study and report the 
results of the analysis of lease versus sale litigation. 
Each research question discussed in Chapter I is examined in 
detail. In interpreting these findings, it must be 
remembered that they are tentative in nature since the small 
sample size prevented definitive conclusions from being 
made.
THE DATA
Data incorporated in this study consisted of lease 
versus sale cases tried in the Tax Court and district 
courts. These cases were identified through a LEXIS search 
supplemented with manuel research techniques. The other 
forum of original jurisdiction, the Court of Claims, had not 
heard any cases relevant to this study. The period this 
litigation covered was from April 13, 1928, to December 31, 
1981. Appeals court decisions were not directly analyzed 
but were used to supplement data gathered from the original 
decision. For an overview of these cases, see Appendix I.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
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The Treasury regulations and Internal Revenue Code of 
1954 provided little assistance in determining the variables 
to be used in this analysis. Code Section 162(a)(3) simply 
states that rental deductions will be denied if lessees 
receive an equity interest in property. Because it provides 
no further clarification, relevant tax articles,
administrative rulings, and judicial decisions were reviewed 
to identify variables crucial in the distinction between
leases and sales.
Initially, all factors mentioned by the Service or tax 
commentators were considered for use in this analysis. 
These variables are depicted in Figure 5-1. However, 
several had to be modified or eliminated because of 
limitations imposed by the data. That is, only factors 
mentioned by the judges could be used since the data source
consisted of judicial opinions. Haturally, some variables
were not listed in all judicial decisions. If judges 
consistently failed to mention a particular variable, or 
revealed it in only a few cases, it was onmitted. For 
example, the minimum profit and investment requirements of 
Rev. Proc. 75-12 were excluded. These variables relate only 
to leveraged lease agreements, few of which have been 
litigated. Accordingly, their inclusion was not appropriate 
in analyzing the litigation. To reduce the number of 
excluded variables, it was assumed that variables not 
discussed in the opinion were not present in the case. This 
seemed realistic because failure to consider relevant data
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FIGURE 5-1
Variables Originally Considered to be Included in the Analysis
Variable Coding
Continuous | Dichotomous
1: Existence of Specific reference 
to interest
X
2. Whether leased property was 
specifically designed for lessee.
X
3. Comparison of lease term and 
expected useful life.
X
4. Comparison of original and 
residual values. X
5. Comparison of lessee improve­
ments to option price.
X
6. Comparison of payments under 
renewal option with original 
rental charges.
X
7. Comparison of monthly rental 
payments to fair rental value.
X
8. Comparision of option price to 
expected fair market value.
X
9.
10.
Comparison of lease payments to 
payments under hypothetical sale.
Rental charges fluctuate.
X
X
11. Lessor's at risk investment. X
12. Existence of nontax profit for 
lessor.
X
13, Whether lessor bears risks of X
ownership.
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can cause a reversal of the decision in a higher court. 
This assumption was operationalized for dichotomous 
variables by coding them one if they were present in the 
opinion and zero if they were absent or not mentioned. 
Since no such assumption could be made for continuous 
variables, some of them had to be modified. These changes 
are described in the discussion of factors used in this 
examination.
Variables Osed
Variable 1. Existence of a specific reference to 
interest in the lease contract.
Onless other factors indicate otherwise, courts will 
generally treat lease transactions containing references to 
interest as sales.
Variable 2. Whether the leased property was designed 
smeçifiçalli for y>e lessee.
The Service considers leases of property not expected 
to be useful to the lessor at the end of the lease term as 
evidence of an original intent to sell (Rev. Proc. 78-30). 
This lack of utility could exist if property was 
manufactured to meet unique needs of the lessee, making it 
very difficult to find other parties willing to lease the 
property after the initial lease term. As a result, the 
lessor could obtain a profit only by leasing it back to the 
original lessee.
Variable 3. The lease term is equal to the expected 
useful life.
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If a lessee acquired use of property for substantially 
less than its useful life, the transaction will generally be 
treated as a lease unless different factors point otherwise. 
However, a purchase may be implied if the lease term is 
approximates the entire life of the asset. Bev. Proc. 
75-12 states that the remaining useful life must be the 
greater of one year or 20% of the original useful life. 
While the Service's position is not binding upon the courts, 
there appears to be some consensus that the shorter the 
expected useful life after the initial lease term, the 
greater the probability the lease will be reclassified as a 
sale (Schwanbeck,1968).
Unfortunately, most opinions do not reveal the 
property's useful life. Since there was no way of 
estimating it in this study, this variable was dichotomized 
to measure whether or not the rental period (including 
extensions) was equal to the expected life.
Variable 4. Improvements were made by lessee.
Though property in a lease generally reverts to the 
lessor at the end of the rental period, lessees often 
improve assets they are renting. This may indicate they 
intended to purchase the property. For example, in 
Oesterreich (226 F.2d 798) , the lessee constructed a 
building costing $300,000 on land he was renting. The 
building would revert with the land to the lessor at the 
expiration of the lease if a $10 option to purchase was not 
exercised. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
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the small option price relative to the amount of 
improvements as one factor indicating a sale was intended. 
In this study, a ratio made of these two numbers could have 
had severe measurement problems. That is, the ratio of 
improvements to option price would have been undefined if 
the option price was zero, as in an automatic transfer of 
title. Conversely, the reciprocal would be undefined when 
no improvements were made. Due to these problems, this 
variable did not compare the amount of improvements with the 
option price but simply measured whether the lessee made 
improvements.
Variable 5. Comparison of payments under renewal op t i ^  
with original rental charges.
Some transactions may be regarded as sales even if 
lessee cannot receive title to the property. One such 
circumstance exists when the lessee has the privilege of 
renewing the lease for an additional period at a nominal 
rental rate. This arrangement entitles him to enjoy the 
benefits of ownership while only incurring a relatively 
small charge. The Service recognized this in Bev. Bui. 
57-371 (1955-2 CB 19) by considering a lease of a sprinkler 
system to be a sale because rental payments for the renewal 
period were only one-twentieth of the original periodic 
payment. Accordingly, this variable consisted of the ratio 
of the original and renewal rates. If no mention of a 
renewal option was made, it was assumed that the lessor 
would renew at the original rate.
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Variable 6. Çoaparison of EMShase ORtion to the 
property’s expected fair market value.
As noted earlier, the mere presence of an option to 
purchase does not determine original intent. However, if 
the option is nominal in relation to the value of the 
property, fiev. Bui. 55-5h0 specifies that the transaction 
would be presumed to be a conditional sale "in the absence 
of compelling factors indicating a different intent." Since 
the option price is usually specified at the time of 
contract, intent can be determined by comparing the option 
price to the asset's expected value. This valuation amount 
should be considered in the light of facts and circumstances 
existing at the creation of the contract, not when the 
option is later exercised (Slabotsky, 1978). Consequently, 
this variable was the ratio of the option price to the 
expected fair market value. This amount was stated by 
judges if it was different from the original cost.
variable 7. Percenteqe of rental Rayments that can be 
È E E l W  to Rurçhase Rriçe.
The Service generally regards a lease as a sale when 
total rental payments plus the option approximate the total 
amount the lessee would have paid in if the asset had been 
purchased (Bev. Rul. 55-540). This position recognizes 
that an interest element may not be explicitly mentioned in 
the contract but hidden in the "rental" charges. In this 
situation, the lessee often pays the same amount he would 
have if he had directly purchased the property. Hypothetical
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sales payments contain an interest element in addition to 
installments of the purchase price. Since relevant rates of 
interest are seldom revealed in judicial opinions, this 
amount cannot be directly measured. However, in these 
circumstances, the lessee can usually reduce the future 
purchase price with rental payments previously made 
(Schwanbeck, 1961). Thus, the percentage of rental payments 
the lessee can apply toward the purchase price will be used 
as a surrogate to measure this factor.
îâ£iâMâ I* PluctuaUon of rental R^ments.
The volatility of the rental schedule will be measured 
with a dichotomized variable. A zero will be assigned if 
the rents are constant and a one will be assigned for 
variable payments.
Variable 9. The lessor incurs the costs of ownership.
In most direct leases the lessor pays for the taxes, 
insurance and other costs associated with ownership. 
Transferal of these costs to the lessee may indicate an 
intention to sell.
Hulticollinearity
There was some multicollinearity among a few of the 
variables originally considered for analysis. For example, 
the presence of a bargain option always was accompanied by 
above market rental charges. Also, assets in leases whose 
term equaled their useful life always had a neglegible 
residual value. The presence of multicollinearity among 
variables biases coefficients of the logit function which
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impairs determination of relative importance. Horeover, 
Pinches (1980) determined that correlation among independent 
variables may also have a substantial impact upon the 
classification results. Unfortunately, no test exists in 
logit to determine the impact multicollinearity might have. 
To reduce this problem, a variable was excluded if it was 
highly correlated with another.
The variables used are depicted in Figure 5-2. 
Incorporating these factors in the logit function discussed
in Chapter IT yielded the following function:
In ( ) = a + 61X1+62X2+63X3+34X11+65X5+66X5+67X7+88X8+69X9
where
XI is the existence of a specific reference to 
interest,
Z2 is whether the leased property was specifically 
designed for the lessee,
X3 is whether the lease term is equal to expected 
useful life,
X4 is whether improvements were made by lessee,
X5 is a comparison of payments under a renewal option 
with original rental charges,
X6 is a comparison of option price to expected value, 
X7 is the percentage of rental payments that can be 
applied to purchase price,
X6 is whether rental payments are constant, and
X9 is whether the lessee bears the costs of ownership.
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FIGURE 5-?
Independent Variables to be Included in Analysis
Variable
1. Existence of specific 
reference to Interest.
2. Design of propert to 
meet unique needs of 
lessee.
3. Lease term Is equal to 
expected life.
4. Improvements were 
made by lessee.
5. Comparison of payments 
under a renewal option 
with original rental 
charges.
6. Comparison of option 
to expected value
7. Percent of rental 
payments that can be 
applied to purchase 
price.
8. Rental payments are 
even.
9. Lessor incurs costs 
of ownership.
Coding
Continuous | Dichotomous
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The next section presents the analysis of this function.
RESEARCH QUESTION 1 
Analysis of Stability
Before a model explaining litigated decisions was 
constructed, the stability of the data was tested in order 
to determine whether the function analyzed might have 
resulted from chance and thus could not have been 
replicated. The need for a determination of stability has 
been recognized by researchers using other statistical 
techniques. Crash and Perreault (1977) suggested a method 
to evaluate the stability of coefficients developed in 
discriminant analysis. Specifically, a sample can be 
divided into several subgroups with discriminant functions 
derived from all groups but one. After each subgroup has 
been systematically withheld, the coefficients and 
significant variables derived for each function can be 
compared and contrasted. Only after this has been done. 
Crash and Perreault argue, could the model's general 
validity be evaluated.
Since discriminant analysis and logit analysis are 
similar, the method just described should also apply to 
logit. In this study, ten separate hold out samples were 
withdrawn from the analysis. The resulting logit functions 
are depicted in Figure 5-3
In each of these functions, variable 16 (ratio of 
option price to expected value) was significant. Moreover,
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FIGURE 5-3 
RESULTS OF TEST FOE STABILITY
Sample Constant n n X7 Ll
1 .814 .913 0 -.0392 .739 .0161
2 2.030 0 0 -.0353 .663 0
3 2.760 0 0 -.0406 0 0
4 1.180 .899 0 -.0394 0 .015
5 2.740 0 0 -.0382 0 0
6 2.310 0 0 -.0348 0 0
7 2.750 0 0 -.0388 0 0
8 2.400 0 0 -.0428 .738 0
9 2.270 0 -.0247 -.0330 0 0
10 3.990 0 0 -.0371 1.21 0
its coefficient stayed relatively constant. In contrast, 
there appears to be no pattern to the admission of other 
variables into the functions. This implies that their 
inclusion may have been based on chance or were very 
dependent upon their particular analysis sample. As such, 
they cannot be replicated. This violates a critical 
requisite of empirical research (Abdel-Khalik and Ajinka, 
1980), causing the general validity of these models to be 
low. Consequently, the unstable variables were not analyzed 
and only 16 was included in the analysis. In this manner, 
internal validity should have been maximized.
Model
The logit model developed from using X6 had the
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following form:
5-1)In ( Pi)=2.26-.0332X6
l'=Fi
The negative coefficient signifies that an increase in 
X6 decreases the probability that the transaction will be 
classified as a sale. This is logical, since higher values 
of X6 occur when option prices approach fair market values. 
As indicated earlier, approximation of an option price to 
expected value is a strong indication that a lease was 
intended. Consequently, high values of X6 should, in 
accordance with theory, generate lower probabilities of a 
sale.
In this study, .5 was used as the cut off probability 
point in the classification of the cases as sales or leases. 
Cases with probabilities of less than .5 were assigned lease 
treatment while those with probabilities exceeding .5 were 
treated as sales. At this cut off probability, the critical 
value of the independent variable was calculated to be 
68.07. This means that transactions with values less than 
68.07 were classified as sales while cases containing values 
exceeding this amount were predicted to be leases. The 
critical value was calculated by substituting .5 into 
equation 5-1, as demonstrated in the following steps:
5-2) In =2 . 26-. 0332X6
5-3) In (1)=2.26-,0332X6
5-h) 0=2.26-.0332X6
5-5) .0332X6=2.26
5-6) X6=68.07
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This signifies that the judiciary regards options of less 
than 68.07% of expected values as conferring an equity 
interest to the lessee in the cases analyzed.
Figure 5-U depicts the results of the stepwise process 
that developed the function. Before the independent
variable was entered into the model, the statistic was 
significant at the .003 level. This means that predictions 
based on a function consisting only of a constant were 
significantly different from observed classifications. 
After 16 was entered, the significance level of the 
statistic decreased to .491. As a result, a null hypothesis 
stating that there is no difference between observed and 
expected frequencies could not be rejected.
Goodness of Fit
Onlike regression analysis, logit does not compute an R 
statistic to directly measure the amount of variability 
explained. Instead, it measures the difference between 
explained and observed frequencies with the likelihood ratio 
(L^  ) depicted in equation 5-7. This statistic follows a 
chi-square distribution with the degrees of freedom equaling 
the number of parameters assumed to have no effect on the 
expected cell frequencies (Knoke and Burke, 1980, p. 30). 
5-7) =2Zf ^ .In (f^./F ..)
where,
Fij is the expected cell frequency, and 
fij is the observed cell frequency.
When the observed frequencies differ greatly from the
FIGURE 5-4 
Summary of Stepwise Results
Improvement Goodness of Fit
Step No. Term Entered DF Lor Likelihood  P_ ______ B__
0 -50.859 47.180 .003
1 X6 1 -38.516 24.687 .000 22.494 .491
00
Ln
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expected ones, likelihood ratios increase in magnitude. In
contrast, models whose expected frequencies closely match
2
the observed ones will have low L s . Accordingly, the 
lower the L statistic, the better the fit of the model.
The likelihood statistic for a model treating all 
independent variables insignificant (known as the baseline
model) can be nsed to evaluate improvements in fit from more
2
complex models. Since the baseline L indicates total 
variance the dependent variable exhibits, it is very large, 
is independent variables are introduced, the model's 
predictions become more accurate, causing the L statistic to 
decrease. If the proportion of baseline variance explained 
by the alternative model (L^ alternative) is high, the 
alternative may be judged to provide a satisfactory fit
(Knoke and Burke, 1981), as shown in equation 5-6.
2 2 
2 1 baseline-L alternative
5-8) R analog = I?baseline
If the amount is low, the alternative model has not
explained much more variance than the baseline model.
According to Figure 2, the baseline likelihood ratio is
-50.859. The model with 16 is -38.516. By taking the
difference and dividing by the baseline amount we get 29.3%.
This implies that approximately one-fourth of the variance
in the analyzed judicial decisions was explained by this
variable.
Predictive Ability. The model's predictive ability was much 
higher than the 29.3% of the variance explained would lead 
one to believe. Though this can be demonstrated by the
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classifications of the cases used to develop the model, it 
is generally accepted that an overly optimistic prediction 
results when observations used to construct the model are 
classified by that same function (e.g., Frank, Massy and 
Morrison, 1979). This is because the model incorporates 
unique characteristics of the sample, thereby facilitating 
its correct classification.
One possible way to eliminate this bias is to randomly 
withdraw a small percentage of the cases from the sample 
before the logit model is calculated. Then the model is 
constructed from the remaining cases. The ability to 
classify the excluded cases is an indication of the accuracy 
of the logit model. Since observations in the hold out 
sample were not used to construct this model, the accuracy 
of the classification should not be inherently biased. In 
this study, the hold out sample was 10% of the cases, 
allowing the logit function to be developed from a 
relatively large sample of over 70 cases. To classify the 
cases a probability was calculated using the cumulative 
logistic function: ^
5-10) V  1 + e ^
Appendix II depicts the probabilities for each case in 
both analysis and validation samples. Assuming equal costs 
of misclassification, the cut off probability chosen was 
that which misclassified the fewest cases. This was .5. 
Limitations associated with the assumption of equal 
misclassification costs are discussed in Chapter VI.
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Table 5-5 presents the predictive ability of the logit 
function in the sample used to construct it. The table 
illustrates that the model correctly classified 81.3% of the 
cases. This indicates that the relationship of option price 
to expected value can predict the vast majority of lease
versus sale decisions. Since this prediction is probably
optimistic, the function was applied to the seven cases 
withheld from the model's calculation. Figure 5-6 portrays 
the classification accuracy for the validation sample. As 
can be seen, 100% of those cases were correctly classified»
Despite the high predictive ability, thirteen cases 
were still misclassified. This suggests that in certain 
circumstances, factors other that the relationship of option 
price to expected value are crucial in judicial decisions.
To identify these conditions, each misclassified case was
analyzed. The next section presents the results of this 
analysis.
Analysis of Misclassified Cases
Benton. Since the independent variable in this analysis was 
the ratio of an option price to expected value, it is not 
surprising that the Tax Court's decision was misclassified. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Tax Court in Benton based its 
verdict upon a comparison of the option
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FIGURE 5-b
Classification Accuracy for Analysis Sample
Actual
Number
of
Predicted Group Membership
Group
Cases
Sale Lease
Sale 41 34 7
Lease 33 6 21
Percent of Cases Correctly Classified: 81.3%
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FIGURE 5^6
Classification Accuracy of Validation Sample
Number
Predicted Group Sales
Actual of
Group Cases
Sale Lease
Sale 5 5 0
Lease
. .1
2 0 2
Percent of Cases Correctly Classified: 100%
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price to original value. The Fifth Circuit (197 P. 2d 745), 
felt this comparison gave an unfair advantage to the 
government and compared the option to expected value. 
Finding the option price to be a reasonable estimate of the 
asset's value, it reversed the Tax Court's decision.
Converse. In Converse (43 AFTB 1308), Hawley Pulp and Paper 
Company permitted Converse to log timber on its property, 
provided Converse used his own equipment. is compensation 
for his services. Converse was to receive 75 cents for every 
M feet of logs be sold. Hawley had an option to purchase 
Converse's equipment for its original value less any amount 
paid to Converse for its depreciation. Since no payments 
for depreciation were made, the option payment was equal to 
the original value. Though payment of fair market value is 
generally an indication of an intention to lease, the 
District Court of Oregon considered the option to be "in 
truth and fact" an agreement to purchase the equipment. 
Accordingly, it held that Converse had made a sale to 
Hawley.
Foellinqer. In Foellinqer (29 AFTB 1416) , Oscar Foellinger 
sold real estate to J. Earl Shaw for $9,000. Because the 
transaction was structured as a contract to purchase. Shea 
could not receive title until all payments were made. Until 
that time, the contract stipulated that the relationship 
between the parties was one of landlord and tenant. If Shea 
defaulted, all payments made by him were to be treated as
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rent.
In November 1935, Shea defaulted. Helene Foellinger, 
executor of Oscar Foellinger*s estate, ignored the provision 
requiring rental treatment and considered the transaction to 
be a sale. This vas done in order to take advantage of the 
long term capital gains deduction. She supported her 
position with the contention that the agreement was in 
essence a sale, since Shea was to automatically receive 
title after he had made all required payments. Nonetheless, 
the District Court of Indiana believed that the contract's 
explicit requirement for rental treatment could not be 
ignored. Consequently, it ruled that the transaction was a 
lease.
Martin. In Martin (44 TC 731), the taxpayer created a 
corporation to assist him in acquiring a piece of real 
estate. This was accomplished by having the corporation 
purchase the property and then lease it to him. The 
taxpayer could purchase the property by exercising an option 
to purchase which became effective six months after the 
commencement of the lease. If the option was exercised, 
"lease payments" were to automatically become "installment 
payements." This was easily done since the purchase price 
equaled total rental payments. After the option was 
exercised, the closely held corporation was liquidated.
Invoking the substance over form doctrine, the Tax 
Court held that the initial agreement was a contract to 
sell. The only rationale they could find for structuring the
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transaction as a lease vas to enable the lessor to have a 
six month holding period, qualifying it for a long term 
capital gain. Since the sole reason a lease form was chosen 
was to minimize taxes, the court concluded that the parties* 
original intention was to sell.
Heiselnan. The Tax Court restructured in Heiselman (1961 
TCn 90) a transaction originally treated as a sale to be a 
lease. In this case, the taxpayer contracted to sell seven
theaters he had owned and operated to S telling-Gosset 
Theaters. The property the theaters were located on was not 
included in the sale but was conveyed on a lease basis. 
Persuant to this transfer, Heiselnan agreed to insure the 
theaters and replace or restore any damage caused by fire. 
He did this despite the fact that ownership had been 
transferred to Stellings-Gosset. Additionally, Heiselman 
could repurchase the equipment at the end of the term for 
one-hundred dollars. The Tax Court felt these condiitons 
prevented Heiselman from transferring his entire equity 
interest and treated the transfer of equipment as a lease.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (9 AFTR 2d 1053) 
disagreed with the Tax Court's analysis. They placed great
weight upon the fact that the parties had originally made an 
oral agreement to sell the theaters before the contract was 
drafted. Heiselman had testified that he decided to reduce 
his business activities because of his poor health. The Tax 
Court had countered that he did not intend to get out of the 
theater business but was trying to raise money to pay over
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$125,000 in civil liabilities. Heiselman supported his 
position by demonstrating in detail that he had ample
resources available to pay these liabilities. Since this
testimony was not disputed by the government, the Fifth
Circuit decided that his primary motive was not to raise 
funds. Furthermore, it found no evidence suggesting that 
the equipment had been sold with an ownership interest 
retaind by Heiselman and concluded that the Tax Court was 
incorrect in its interpretation of the covenants of the 
contract. For example, the court decided that Heiselnan 
insured the theaters because rental payments on the land 
were based on the income generated by the theaters. Thus, 
he was very affected by whether or not the transferee had 
sufficient funds to keep the theater in operation because 
his rental payments depended upon it. The commitment to 
insure did not indicate any retained equity interest.
With respect to the option to purchase, there was 
undisputed evidence that this provision was made to assure 
the transferee that he would not bear the expense of 
removing the equipment at the expiration of the lease on the 
land. This was a concern because the equipment expected to 
be of little value when the lease expired. Evidence 
indicated that the consideration paid under the contract 
exceeded the economic value of the equipment, especially 
since the equipment would have no substantial value at the 
termination of the lease. Thus, the court ruled that 
Heiselman did not retain any ownership interest in the
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equipment and had instead intended to sell his entire 
interest to Stellings-Gosset Theaters, Inc.
HiditSSi Metal Stamp.
Midwest Metal Stamping Company (1965 TC Memo 65,279) 
installed a sprinkler system in a building it rented. The 
contract stipulated that Midwest would lease the system and 
pay -fU,000 as rent for sis years with the option to renew at 
the end of the sixth year. Though the contract contained a 
renewal option, the manufacturer, St. Louis Automatic 
Sprinkler, could not reposses the system , even if Midwest 
failed to pay any further rent.
During the trial, the president of St. Louis Automatic 
Sprinkler Co. testified that he had always considered the 
transaction to be a sale since payments made by Midwest 
during the first six years equaled the system's purchase 
price. It was only structured as a lease at the suggestion 
of Midwest. In view of these facts, the Tax Court concluded 
that Midwest had all of the benefits of ownership and 
treated the transaction as a sale.
Pitnev-Bowes Postage Meter. In Pitney-Bowes Postage Meter 
(150 P.2d 332), the taxpayer leased postage meters in order 
to avoid an excise tax imposed upon their sale. The lease 
contracts had the economic effect of sales because the 
lessor was prevented from cancelling the leases as long as 
any rent was paid. This enabled lessees to use postage 
meters for their entire useful lives. Since the agreements
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were in substance sales and the lease form was simply a 
device to avoid the excise tax on sales, the court denied 
the rental deduction and imposed the excise tax.
Oesterreicfa. Rhile analyzing the facts in Oeserreich (1953 
TC Memo 53,085), the Tax Court was under the impression that 
the lease contract was ambiguous in its description of the 
responsibilities of the lessor and lessee. Accordingly, it 
did not analyze its provisions to determine intent but 
focused upon the manner in which the lessor and lessee 
treated the transaction. Since both parties had recorded 
the agreement as a lease, the Tax Court ruled it was such, 
despite the fact that the lessee could purchase over two 
million dollars of real estate for only $10 at the end of 
the lease term.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (226 F.2d 798) 
totally rejected this argument. To them, the agreement was 
not confusing, so outside evidence was not needed to explain 
it. Furthermore, they ruled that accounting treatment is 
not determinative of original intent. Instead, intent 
should be ascertained through the provisions of the lease 
contract. Since the lessee in this case would acquire 
property for a nominal sum, he was receiving an equity 
interest with each payment. Accordingly, this transaction 
was reclassified as a sale.
lëàÂS. am&uÊâÇlaring Company
In 1963, Beade Manufacturing Company (1973 TC Memo
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73,259) attempted to sell its herbicide division. Read 
Railroad Inc., to Borax. Borax vas unwilling to purchase 
the company immediately because it had little experience in 
that area of business. Instead, it offered to lease the 
division and decide whether or not to purchase it at a later 
date. Beade reluctantly agreed, and the transfer was 
structured as a lease with an option to purchase. Though 
Beade had acquiesced to this treatment, it later 
unsuccessfully endeavored to induce Borax to change the 
transaction's form to a sale. Borax consistently refused to 
do so.
The contract provided for Borax to pay cent totaling 
60% of the purchase price. If the business was profitable, 
it could acquire it by paying the remaining 40%, which was 
$350,000. Nevertheless, at the end of the term. Borax 
allowed the option to expire. Even so, the Service still 
considered this agreement to be a sale since Borax could 
have purchased the division for only 40% of its value.
Departing from its own economic test, the Tax Court 
went beyond the economic factors in its determination of 
intent. Though it agreed with the Service that Borax's 
failure to exercise the option was irrelevant, it still
considered the original intent was to lease. A strong
indicator of this intent was Beade*s attempt to have Borax 
change the form of the transaction with Borax's refusal.
From this, the court inferred that both parties considered
the transaction to be a sale. Furthermore, the option.
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though only 40% of the value, was viewed as significant in 
magnitude. The court believed that these factors overruled 
the presumption of a sale caused by the small relationship 
of option price to expected value.
Starr. Like Midwest Metal, Starr (30 TC 856), involved a 
lease of a sprinkler system. Once again, total rental 
payments were equal to those that would have been made under 
an installment sale. Moreover, the "lessor" had originally 
treated the transaction as a sale. Evidence showed that 
payments after the first five years were actually service 
charges for the inspection of the system. In light of these 
facts, the Tax Court concluded that the only reason the 
transaction was structured as a lease was so Starr could 
deduct the payments as rent. Since this was not adequate 
justification, the transaction was held to be a sale.
J. Strickland G Company. Strickland G Company (14 APTR 2d 
5025), a cosmetics firm, purchased raw materials and 
equipment from Newbro. In addition to the items purchased, 
Strickland was granted a license to market products owned by 
Newbro. Strickland was also given the option to purchase 
the trademarks for $20,000, an amount only 27.1% of the 
trademarks total value.
Until the exercise of the option, Strickland deducted 
payments as ordinary and necessary business expenses. 
Nonetheless, the Commissioner considered the transaction a 
sale and required capitalization of the payments. During
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the first trial, the District Court (1U AFTR 2d 5025) placed 
heavy emphasis upon Strickland's oral testimony that it did 
not want to purchase the business but only obtain a license 
to manufacture and sell the cosmetics. Consequently, the 
court ruled that a sale was not originally intended.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (16 AFTR 2d 5998) 
found that the District Court's decision vas "clearly 
erroneous." The court noted that letters written by 
attorneys of the two companies emphasized the tax advantage 
of a licensing agreement over a direct sale. Additionally, 
royalties paid for use of the trademarks seemed to exceed 
reasonable amounts. An additional indication of an intent to 
sell was the provision requiring Strickland to incur large 
advertising and promotion expenses, costs usually associated 
with ownership.
Tomlinson. Dnlike most of the other cases analyzed in this 
study, Tomlinson (6 AFTB 2d 5304) was decided by a jury. In 
this case, the taxpayer had an option to purchase land he 
rented for $115,000 which was to be reduced for rent paid. 
Since this was $50,000 at the time of exercise, Tomlinson 
paid $65,000 to acquire title to land originally worth 
$115,000. In his instructions to the jury, the judge stated 
that Tomlinson must prove two items before he could have a 
judgement in his favor: first that the rental payments were
necessary for the continued use of the property; and second, 
that they did not transfer an equity interest to the lessee. 
The jury's decision for the taxpayer implies that these
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conditions were satisfied. Unfortunately, the basis for 
their opinion was not reported, preventing the determination 
of factors that influenced their decision.
Western Contracting» The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the Tax Court's decision (TC Memo 1958-77) in 
Western Contracting Corporation. In this case, the taxpayer 
leased 123 peices of heavy equipment, purchasing 93 of them 
at the end of the lease term. Though none of these leases 
had an option to purchase clause, the Tax Court held that 
they were sales because lessees could reduce the purchase 
prices by the rentals previously paid. The court felt that 
this demonstrated an implied provision for an option to 
purchase. However, the government failed to produce any 
evidence, written or oral, that side agreements had been 
made granting the lessees options to purchase. Moreover, 
the Eighth Circuit determined that the end payments made by 
the lessee represented the fair market value of the 
equipment at that time. Consequently, it decided that the 
leases were bona fide.
Summary of Analysis of Hisclassi^d Cases. Figures 5-7and 
5-8 summarize the characteristics of the cases just 
discussed. Though the logit model containing only the ratio 
of option to value explained a large percent of the lease 
litigation, there are still factors that must be taken into 
consideration in structuring lease transactions. &s can be 
seen in Figure 5-7 the judiciary appears to frown upon
FIGURE 5-7 
Sale Decisions Predicted to be Leases
r ac ter j. s t i cs 
Case _ Reversed
Nominal
Renewal
Option Approximate 
to Expected Value
Designed
to
.Minimize 
Taxes
Option Agreement 
Was Actually 
Contract to Sell
1. Benton X X
2. Converse X
3. Martin X X
4. Midwest Metal X X
5. Pitney Bowes X X
6. Starr X X
7. Western Contracting X X
( N
O
FIGURE 5-8 
Lease Decisions Preaicted to be Sales
^  "''■^Gb^ra^’.erlstics
Case ' ^ ^ Reversed
Option Seemed 
Significant
Used
Intent
Test
Business
Reason
Bound by 
Original Contract
1. Foellinger X
2. Heiselman X
3. Reade X X X
4. Strickland X X
5. Tomlinson X
6. Oesterreich X X
103
transactions designed as leases simply to obtain a tax 
advantage. In these circumstances, the transaction mill 
probably be reclassified as a sale even if the ratio of 
option price to expected value exceeds the critical value 
determined in this study. Similarly, business reasons for 
lease agreements can justify lease treatment even if the 
options are relatively low, as in Beade Manufacturing 
Company. Further implications of these results are 
discussed in chapter VI.
RESEARCH QUESTION 2
Two approaches were taken to ascertain whether the Tax 
and District Courts were significantly different in their 
decision processes. In the first method, the accuracy of 
the model developed in Research Question for Tax Court cases 
was contrasted with its predictive ability for cases tried 
before the district courts, as depicted in Figures 5-9 and 
5-10.
Though the accuracy was somewhat higher in the Tax 
Court, this probably results from the fact that there were 
fewer cases in the district courts. Accordingly, further 
analysis was necessary before any conclusions could be made.
To gain further insight into possible judicial 
conflict. Tax Court misclassifications were compared with 
those made by district courts. As depicted in Figures 5-11 
and 5-12, two of the seven sales cases predicted to be 
leases were tried in the district courts. Each had
10:
FIGURE 5-9
Classification Accuracy of Model for Tax Court Cases
Actual
-
Number
of
Predicted Group Membership
Group Cases
Sale Lease
Sale 40 35 5
Lease 23 0 20
Percent of Cases Correctly Classified: 87.3%
10?
FIGURE 5-10
Classification Accuracy of Model for District Court Cases
Actual
Number
of
Cases
Predicted Group Sales
Group
Sale Lease
Sale 6 4 2
Lease 12 3 9
Percent of Cases Correctly Classified: 77.8%
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FIGURE 5-11 
SALE DECISIONS PREDICTED TO BE LEASES
Tax Court Cases Reversed
Bertor Yes
Martin No
Midwest Metal No
Starr No
Weston Contracting Yes
Nominal Renewal
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Disguised Purchase
No
Yes
No
No
No
District Court Cases
Converse 
Pitney Bowes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
10:
FIGURE 5-12 
Lease Decisions Predicted to be Sales
Option Deemed Parties Bound
Reversed Significant by Contract
Tax Court
Meiselman Yes No No
Reade No Yes No
Oestereich Yes Yes Yes
District Court
Foellinger No No Yes
Strickland Yes No No
Tomlinson No Yes No
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characteristics similar to Tax Court misclassifications. 
Specifically, the contract in Pitney-Bowes , tried by a 
district court, contained a nominal renewewal clause, as did 
leases in two Tax Court cases, Starr and Midwest Metal. In 
both judicial forums, the nominal renewal option was 
considered evidence of an intent to sell. The Tax Court and 
district courts also treated similarly contracts in 
Converse and Martin where the option was in essence a 
contract to purchase. As a result, the district courts* 
decisions do not appear to depart from the cases tried by 
the Tax Court.
This is also true with lease decisions predicted to be 
sales. Of the three cases tried in the district courts, 
one, Strickland, was reversed on appeal. In a second case, 
Tomlinson. the court considered an option of 57% to be 
significant, which is lower than the 68.07% cutoff point 
determined by the model. However, the Tax Court also had a 
case that did not follow the model* cut off point. In 
Reade. an option of <tO% was viewed as substantial. Thus, 
the district court's decision cannot be viewed as a 
departure from the Tax Court's decisions.
In the third district court misclassification, 
Foellinger. the taxpayer was denied the right to restructure 
a transaction to a sale. The court did not analyze the 
agreement's economic essence but compelled the parties to 
abide by the original structure. The Tax Court was faced 
with a similar situation in Estate of Holzwarth (1964 TCM
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304) where a taxpayer attempted to change a lease to a sale. 
Though the attempt was unsuccessful, the court did 
automatically force the parties to use the original form. 
Instead it based its verdict on the elements contained in 
the contract. This seems in line with Bither and Beinhoff's 
(1979) conclusion that most forums will permit taxpayers to 
restructure their transactions in order to better represent 
economic reality. The District Court of Indiana appears to 
be in the minority in its refusal to do so.
To further determine whether any discord existed, a 
model was developed based only on Tax Court decisions. If 
separate decision rules were in use, the Tax Court's model 
would not be a good predictor of district court cases. To 
aid in the identification of a Tax Court model, the 
stability of the variables was tested. The results of this 
test are reported in Figure 5-13.
As was the case for the data in Research Question 1, 
only variable 16 demonstrated the requisite stability. 
Consequently, the model developed was based upon this 
variable.
Loqit Bodel.
The logit model based on Tax Cases had the following
form:
5-11) In t^_)=2.92-.0415X6 
Based upon this function and a cutoff probability of 
•5, the critical value of X6 was 70.36. This is so close to 
the 68.07 determined in Research Question 1 that the
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FIGURE 5-13
RESULTS OF TEST FOR STABILITY
Sample Consent XI 15 X6 n
1 2.430 0 0 -.0448 .979 0
2 3.980 0 0 -.0531 0 0
3 2.470 0 0 -.0360 0 0
4 2.470 0 0 -.0502 1.400 0
5 2.660 0 0 -.0436 .984 0
6 3. 830 0 0 -.0520 0 0
7 2.870 0 0 -.0398 0 0
8 2.860 0 0 -.0388 0 0
9 3.220 0 0 -.0523 0 .0143
10 2.550 0 0 -.0415 .914 0
classification of cases were the same. Since this model is 
not significantly different from the previous model, it was 
not separately analyzed.
BESEARCH QUESTION 3
Research Question 1 determined that leases whose option 
prices exceeded 66.07% of expected value have a higer 
probability of being classified as leases than sales. Since 
this figure was based on cases covering the entire period of 
controversy, taxpayers may not be able to rely upon it if 
judicial emphasis had changed over the years. To determine 
whether instability had ocu.red, the cases were divided into 
three separate time periods. The two dates used to separate
Ill
the cases were 1955 and 1964. The first date was important 
because the Service issued Rev. Bui. 55-540, delineating 
the factors it considered evidence of a sale. The second 
was significant due to the issuance of APB Opinion Ho. 5. 
Though accounting treatment does not control a transaction's 
tax consequences, the judiciary may have been affected by 
these rules. Moreover, this was the first pronouncement by 
the accounting profession setting mandatory guidelines as to 
the proper accounting of leases. The requirements of this
Figure 5-14 
Comparison of Models for Time Periods
Time Period Function Critical Value of 16
Before 1955 1.17-,0194X6 87.63
1955-1965 3.52-.0494X6 71.26
After 1965 4.04-.0605X6 66.78
opinion were discussed in chapter III.
The separate models developed for each of the time 
periods are depicted in Figure 5-14, with their 
corresponding critical values for X6. As can be seen, the 
values decreased in magnitude for each consecutive period. 
Specifically, it was 87.63 in the first period, 71.26 in the 
second, and 66.66 in the third. This reduction over time 
may imply that the judiciary became more lenient in its 
evaluation of variable X6. However, it may have resulted
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FIGURE 5-15
CASES niSCLlSSIFIED BY AT LEAST ONE OF THE TIME PERIOD
MODELS
A B C
Beaudry Yes No No
Benton Yes Yes Yes
Be us No No Yes
Converse Yes Yes Yes
Foellinger Yes Yes Yes
Gordon Yes No No
Holawarth No No Yes
Heiselnan Yes Yes Yes
Oesterreich Yes Yes Yes
Pitney Bowes Yes Yes Yes
Reade Yes Yes Yes
Smith, Charles (a) Yes Ho No
Smith, Charles (b) Yes No No
Smith, N. B. No Yes Yes
Strickland Yes Yes Yes
Tomlinson Yes Yes Yes
Western Contracting Yes Yes Yes
113
simply from the unique characteristics of the samples. 
Consequently, further analysis was necessary. To determine 
whether the identified decision rules had a different impact 
upon the classification process, the litigation was 
classified with each model. The classifications for each 
case are depicted in Appendix II. Figure 5-15 shows that 
seventeen cases were misclassifled by at least one of the 
functions,but only six of these received different
treatment. Since the models generated conflicting
predictions in only 7.4% of the population of lease versus 
sale litigation, differences in the models may not be 
significant.
BESEARCH QOESTIOM 4
To determine whether the Service's guidelines in Bev. 
Proc. 75-12 and 75-28 were consistent with judicial
decisions, each case was classified using the Service's
requirements.-1- The resulting classifications were then 
compared and contrasted with the original decision, as 
depicted in Figure 5-16. .
-1- One of the Service's guidelines treats transactions as 
sales if the rental period exceeds 80% of the asset's useful 
life. However, most opinions did not reveal expected life 
and generally mention it only if it equaled the rental 
period. Since there was no way to estimate this amount, 
transactions were coded as sales if their rental period 
(including extensions) was equal to the expected useful 
life.
1 14
FIGORE 5-16
COMPARISON OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL CLASSIFICATIONS
Group Membership 
Guidelines Applied Sale Lease
Administrative 66 (56.5) 15 (24.5)
Judicial 47 (56.5) 34 (24.5)
Percent Agreed: 67.1%
If there vas no relationship between the Service's and 
courts' positions, the classifications would not be 
homogeneous. To determine the amount of homogeneity, 
expected frequencies were calculated for each cell, as shown 
in the parentheses in Figure 5-16. An expected frequency is 
the amount one would find if the populations were
homogeneous with respect to the variable of interest
(Daniel, 1976). These can be calculated for each cell with 
the formula in equation 5-1.
5-12) E^.=n. n ./n
where
Ejjis the expected frequency for the cell in row i and column n, 
n i, is the total number of observations in row i, 
n is the total number of observations in column j, and 
n is the total number of observations.
To determine whether the expected frequencies were
significantly different from observed, a y} test was used.
This statistic has the following form:
(0,..
' X - i
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where:
Oij is the observed frequency in each cell, 
c is the number of columns, and 
r is the number of rows.
The statistic for the relationship in Figure 5-15 is 
10.56, with one degree of freedom. This is significant at 
the .001 level, signifying that judicial and administrative 
classifications were not homogeneous. In other words, the 
Service's guidelines produced classifications significantly 
different from judicial decisions.
To understand how they differed, each case in which the 
Service and judiciary disagreed was analyzed, as portrayed 
in Figure 5-17. As can be seen, thirteen of the nineteen 
cases has had fixed options that exceeded 66.07% of expected 
value. The Service would regard these transactions as sales 
while they received lease treatment from the courts. This 
suggests that the Service's treatment of all transactions 
with fixed options as sales is far more stringent than the 
judiciary's requirements. Basically, the judiciary will 
permit fixed options as long as they approximate expected 
value. Four other misclassifications were also incorrectly 
predicted by the logit model developed in Research Question 
1. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, each of these 
decisions was based on unique characteristics indicating 
intent. The remaining case in Figure 5-17 received sale 
treatment because its rent fluctuated beyond the Service's 
safe-harbor amounts. Presumably, the judiciary did not
riKurc 3-1/ ^
Cases Misciassltled by Services Guidelines
Characteristics
Case
Specific Option 
Equal To 100% 
of Expected Value
Option Greater Than 
68.07% of Value
Option Less 
Than 68 %
Rent Fluctuation 
Exceeded Safe- 
Harbor Amount
1. Arkansas Bank X
2. Beaudry X
3. Cal-Maine X X
4. Daniel X X
5. Fairmont X X
6. Foellinger
7. Gilken X X
8. Gordon X
9. Holawarth X
10. Kearney & Trecker X
11. Meiselman*
12. Oesterreich*
13. Reade X
14, Smith, Charles X
15. Smith, Charles X
16. Stunder X
17. Tomlinson X
18. Van Etten X
19. WBSR X
*rAvf>r.«56d on anneal
Figure 5-17, Con.
Cases Misclasslfled by Services Guidelines
Characteristics
Case
Term Is 
100% of Life
Intent Test 
Used
Mlsclassified by 
Logit Model
1. Arkansas Bank
2. Beaudry
3. Cal-Maine
4. Daniel
5. Fairmont
6. Foellinger
7. Gilken
8. Gordon
9. Holzwarth
10.Kearney & Trecker
11.Meiselman*
12.Oesterreich*
13.Reade
14.Smith, Charles 
15.Smith, Charles 
16.Stunder
17.Tomlinson
18.Van Etten
19.WSBR
X
X
X
X
X
X
l i a
consider that to be an important factor in that case. Since 
no cases after 1975 had rent that exceeded the permissable 
fluctuation, no conclusion could be made as to this 
requirements impact upon the judiciary.
RESEARCH QUESTION 5
This question assesses the similarity of accounting 
profession's lease guidelines with those developed by the 
judiciary. To do this, the requirements of PASB No. 13 were 
used to classify each decision. As discussed in Chapter I, 
FASB 13 requires capital lease treatment if any of the 
following conditions are present:
A. The leasee will automatically become owner at the 
end of the term.
B. The lease contains a bargain purchase clause.
C. The lease term is 75% or more of the useful life.
Da The present value of the minimum rental payments
is greater than or equal to the property's original 
fair market value less any investment tax credit 
retained by the lessor.
Several of these factors had to be operationalized in 
order to facilitate their analysis. For example, FASB 13 
does not contain any guidelines specifying when an option is 
to be considered a bargain. Instead, the facts of each 
transaction are to be considered. To incorporate this 
ambiguous factor into this study, an option was treated as a 
bargain if it was below 68.07% of the expected value. This
Figure 5-18
Comparison of Accounting and Judicial Classification 
Using a cut off point of 68.07%
Sale Lease Total
Accounting Treatment
48(49) 32(33) 81
Judicial Treatment 47(49) 34(33) 81
Total 96 66 162
X = "16
Percent Accurate = 91.4%
120
Figure 5-19
Comparison of Accounting and Judicial Classifications 
Using a cutoff point of 50%
Sale Lease
Accounting Treatment 
Judicial Treatment
38(42.50) 43(38.50)
47(42.50) 34(38.50)
=  2.00 
Percent Accurate: 81.0
Figure 5-20
Comparison of Accounting and Judicial Classifications 
Using a cutoff point of 25%
Sale
Accounting Treatment 
Judicial Treatment
Lease
33(40) 48(41)
37(40) 34(41)
X = 4.84 
Percent Accurate: 78
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was the amount calculated in research question one. To 
determine the impact other amounts would have upon the 
results, other classifications were made based on 25% and 
50%. Bith respect to the fourth requirement, an interest 
rate of 10% was used to calculate the present value of the 
rental payments. Changing this rate to five or fifteen 
percent had no impact upon the classification process.
Table 5-18 contrasts the judiciary's and FASB's 
classifications, using 68.07 as the point determining a 
bargain purchase. Expected frequencies are shown in 
parentheses. For this relationship, the statistic is .16 
which is well below 3.841, the amount required to reject the 
null hypothesis of homogeneity at the .05 level of 
significance. This signifies that the classifications are 
extremely close. In fact, 91.4% of the cases were correctly 
classified. Predictions resulting from 50 and 25 percent 
are shown in Figures 5-19 and 5-20, respectively. 
Differences are not statistically different for the first 
table but are for the second table, implying that the 
accounting rules are such good predictors of judicial 
decisions that their predictions are not greatly affected by 
fluctuations in option prices.
SOHSABT
The findings presented in this chapter indicate that 
the most important factor considered by the judiciary in 
distinguishing between sales and leases is the relationship 
between option prices and expected market values. This
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variable alone explained 81.3% of the cases in the analysis 
sample and 100% of the validation sample. No difference was 
detected between the Tax Court and District Courts and the 
model appeared relatively stable over time. The Service's 
position on leases was found to be significantly different 
from the judiciary's decisions while the accounting 
profession's accurately predicted 91.4%. Implications of 
these findings are discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
SOanABT, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The priaarj objective of this study «as to identify 
factors that could explain judicial decisions 
differentiating between sales and leases. An additional
concern was the degree of compatability among guidelines
issued by the Service and accounting profession with those
developed by the judiciary. As the following discussion 
illustrates, each chapter of this dissertation contributed 
toward the fulfillment of these objectives. The purpose of 
this chapter is to summarize these conclusions, synthesize
them, and discuss implications for future research.
Summary of Previous Chagj^rs
1) Identification of authoritative guidelines for 
distinguishing between sales and leases.
A review of Internal Revenue Code Sections and 
Administrative Rulings is presented in Chapter II.
This examination was essential in identifying factors 
the judiciary and Service use in classifying lease 
transactions. This chapter also traced the evolution 
of judicial interpretation of Congressional intent, 
with particular emphasis placed on differences in 
application.
124
2) Identification of contributions from prior 
lease studies.
Previous lease studies were an additional source that 
helped identify important factors. These articles, 
though qualitative in nature, provided great insight 
into the interplay between the Service and judiciary. 
Chapter III examines past analyses by discussing their 
similarities, contributions, and deficiencies.
1) Izâïination of prior emp^ical t ^  studies
To determine the appropriate methodology to be used, 
prior empirical tax studies are examined in Chapter IV. 
The weaknesses and limitations associated with popular 
statistical techniques, particularly discriminant 
analysis, are discussed. Since discriminant analysis 
has two critical assumptions not met by this project's 
data, it was found not to be appropriate for this 
study.
4) Discussion of logit analysis.
& more robust statistical technique, logit analysis, 
was used to analyze the lease litigation. Chapter IV 
discusses the theory and application of this 
statistical tool.
5) Application of logit to lease litigation.
Chapter V presents the analysis results of eighty-one 
actual lease transactions. The findings indicate that 
one factor, the relationship between option price and
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expected value could explain over 80% of the decisions. 
No substantial differences of application were detected 
over time or between the Tax Court and District Courts.
§) Analysis of guidelines developed by the FASB and IBS. 
Chapter f also reports the comparison of guidelines 
issued by the Service and FASB with and those developed 
by the judiciary. A chi-sguare test revealed that the 
Service's requirements were significantly different 
from judicial decisions. However, no difference was 
detected between the FASB's requirements and the 
decisions.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the individual nature of lease cases, one 
factor, the relationship of option price to expected value, 
was found to be a highly accurate predictor of original 
courts' decisions. Noreover, interpretation of this 
factor's impact on decisions revealed that the probability 
of a sale would fall below .5 if the option exceed 68.07% of 
expected value. In other words, courts generally did not 
reclassify lease transactions unless the relationship 
dropped below that amount. They do not appear to require an 
option price to equal the anticipated value. Even though a 
lease agreement permits a lessee to purchase property for 
less than its fair market value, this does not automatically 
confirm upon him the forbidden equity interest. Instead, as 
observed by Silk (1964) , the judiciary tolerates a small
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difference between option price and market value. Based on 
this study's calculations, this tolerated difference is 
approximately one-third.
is discussed in Chapter III, Silk suggested that this 
judicial restraint may reflect a subconscience desire to aid 
taxpayers who are not overly agressive in obtaining the tax 
advantages of leases. Nevertheless, this judicial attitude 
Vanishes when taxpayers are overtly seeking large tax 
benefits from leases. in analysis of thirteen cases 
misclassified by the logit function revealed that the 
judiciary frowns on transactions structured as leases only 
for tax reasons. In these circumstances, other factors are 
determinative of original intent, even if the option price 
was technically equivalent to expected value. Factors that 
can indicate this include lease term equaling expected life, 
option for lessee to renew at a nominal amount, payments 
approximating sales price, no business reason for lease, or 
avoidance of other taxes.
Congress recently emphasized the importance of business 
motive in its passage of TEFB&. Specifically, for leases 
after 1983 there must be a business, as well as tax reason 
for the lease. let this act permits lease treatment for 
contracts containing options of only 10% of original value. 
This should give finance leases a competitive advantage over 
nonfinance leases since their option would have to be at 
least 68.07% of expected value. Though this is not the same 
as 68.07% of original value, it is still probably higher
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than 10% of original cost.
As the above discussion indicates, taxpayers must be 
sure that other factors do not indicate an intent to sell. 
Utilization of factors other than relationship of option to 
value may indicate that the entire judiciary uses the more 
subjective intent test, as suggested by Schvanbeck.
Specifically, the Tax Court, the developer of the economic 
test, has analyzed in several cases other criteria in its 
determination of original intent. For example, in Reade. 
the court did not consider a 40S option to be too low 
because other actions of the parties indicated that they 
considered it to be a lease. Even so, taxpayers must 
remember that they have the burden of proof when noneconomic 
factors are considered. Because relevant indicators of 
intent would change with each case, taxpayers would be
prevented from relying upon judicial prescedence. Since 
they generally would not know what factors the court would 
consider important, this would be a very high-risk route to 
follow.
While other variables were often considered, no other 
judicial forum used the Seventh Circuits liberal 
interpretation of Sec. 168, applied in Breece Veneer. As 
was discussed in Chapter II, the court felt that this
section implied that the lessee did not have an equity
interest until he exercised his option to purchase. This is 
because before that time, monthly payments were necessary to 
continue using the property. Accordingly, the court
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believed he coaid not have received any ownership interest. 
Since this view has not received general acceptance outside 
the Seventh Circuit, taxpayers would be on very shakey 
ground in basing their case upon this interpretation.
Silk and Schwanbeck both observed differences in 
application by the Service and judiciary. Silk argued that 
this difference was the result of differing views concerning 
the relationship between option price and expected value. 
He believed that the Service prohibited any divergence, no 
Batter how small, between option price and expected value 
while the judiciary tolerates a small variance. By 
classifying the lease litigation with the Service's 
requirements, this study determined that the Service's 
guidelines were significantly different from actual judicial 
decisions. And the majority of the differences were related 
to option prices. Because the judiciary is more lenient 
than the Service, taxpayers can and do successfully 
challenge administrative reclassifications. Nonetheless, in 
so doing, they must be prepared to demonstrate that they did 
not intend to have a sale. Accordingly, factors apart from 
option price must not indicate otherwise.
SXTSRNAL AND 1MT2BNAL VALIDITY
Naturally, in order for the conclusions just discussed 
to be warranted, the evidence generated by this study should 
be valid. In a research design context, validity addresses 
the basic question: Are we measuring what we think we're
measuring?" (Kerlinger, p. 457). There are two general
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dimensions that need to be considered: external and
internal validity. Campbell and Stanley (1963) have given
the following explanation of this dichotomy:
Internal validity is the basic minimum without which 
any experiment is nninterpretable: Did in fact the
experimental treatments make a difference in this 
specific experimental instance. External validity asks 
the question of generalizability: To what populations,
settings, treatment variables, and measurement 
variables can this effect be generalized.
Since these are critical attributes for any research
project, each shall be analyzed with respect to the
characteristics of this study.
Internal Validity
In order for the results to be internally valid, they 
should explain what actually occurred in the data analyzed 
and not simply be the result of chance. In other words, the 
identified independent variable, the relationship of option 
price and expected value, should have an impact upon 
judicial decisions. &n indication that it does was its 
consistent inclusion in the logit function, despite the use 
of different hold out samples. is was described in Chapter 
V, ten functions were calculated from ten different groups 
of cases. Each time, this variable was significant, with 
approximately the same coefficient. No other variable 
displayed any consistency. Possibly, this is because many 
were surrogates for factors that could not be directly 
measured. Several variables originally considered for
analysis were not consistently revealed in the judicial 
opinions. Consequently, modifications in coding or
130
measurement of substitute variables were made in an attempt 
to obtain the same information, as depicted in Figure 6-1. 
If the originally desired factors could have been obtained, 
more variables might have been included in the function. 
However, since none of them were, a descriptive examination 
was made of the misclassified cases to supplement the 
empirical findings and identify factors that were important 
in addition to the statistically significant variable.
Misclassification Costs. One of the major findings of this 
Study was the high predictive ability the relationship of 
option price to expected value has on judicial decisions. 
In determining this accuracy, a cut off probability of .5 
was used to classify the transactions. Cases with 
calculated probabilities less than this were coded as leases 
while those receiving more were classified as sales. If .5 
is not the proper point, these conclusions may not be valid. 
Determination of the appropriate cut point is not arbitrary 
but is the one that has the smallest costs of 
misclassification. This is done by minimizing the cost 
function depicted in Equation 6-1.
6-1 Loss=B E +B E
1 1 2  2
Where
is the number of sales cases predicted to 
be leases,
E is the number of lease cases
2
predicted to be sales, and 
B are the appropriate weights.
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FIGURE 6-1 
Surrogate Variables
Variables Uses Unmeasured Factors
1. Lease is equal to expected 
useful life.
la. Comparison of lease 
term with useful life.
lb. Comparison of original 
and residual values.
2. Improvements were made by lessee.
3. Percent of rental payments that 
could be applied to purchase price.
2o Comparison of improve­
ments to option price.
3. Comparison of hypothetical 
sales price to lessee's total 
payments.
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If misclassification costs are approximately equal, as 
assumed in this study. Equation 6-1 would be restated as 
follows,
6-2 Loss=E +E
1 2
In other words, under this assumption the cut off point 
would simply be the probability that misclassified the 
fewest cases. Nonetheless, if costs associated with one 
type of error greatly exceeded those for the other, the 
optimum probability would be the one that minimized total 
misclassification costs (Hair, et. al., 1979, p.98). If
misclassification costs are not equal, taxpayers cannot 
automatically use .5 in classifying their transactions. 
Accordingly, a discussion of these costs is warranted.
One type of error that could occur is the prediction of 
a sale when the actual decision was a lease. A taxpayer 
following the model would decide not to challenge the 
Service's reclassifications, believing he would have lost in 
court. In so doing, he saves any court costs he would have 
incurred had he litigated but loses the deduction the court 
would have permitted.
Alternatively, the model could predict a lease when the 
ruling would be a sale. In this circumstance, the taxpayer, 
thinking he will win, contests the Service's 
reclassification, incurring court costs and tying up 
valuable time in the process. Despite his efforts, the 
verdict is against him and he is denied the additional 
deduction. Yet since the deduction would have been
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prohibited had he not contested the Service's 
reclassification, the actual costs of this error are the 
expenses of litigation. The costs associated with each type 
of error are compared in Figure 6-2 and summarized in 
Equations 6-3 and 6-<l:
6-3 CEi=T-C 
where
CE^ is the cost of predicting a sale when it 
is a lease,
T is the additional tax liability, and 
C represents the court costs.
The costs associated with predicting a lease when the 
decision would be a sale are depicted in Equation 6-4.
6-4 CE2 =C 
where
CE 2 denotes the cost of predicting a lease 
when it is a sale.
Treatment of these costs as equal yields the following 
relationship:
6-5 T-C=C
This situation can exist only when the tax liability is 
twice as large as the expenses of litigation, as 
demonstrated with the following equation:
6-6 T=2C
Accordingly, use of .5 is appropriate when expected costs are 
approximately half of the claimed deficiency. With the high 
legal costs of today's society, this may be reasonable in
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FIGURE 6-2 
Costs of Misclassification
Sale Predicted— Lease Decision
Loses deduction 
Saves court costs
Lease Predicted— Sale Decision
Pays court costs 
_____________________________ V
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■any situations. However, if it is not, estimates of the 
weights in Equation 6-1 need to be made to determine the 
correct cut off probability. This is illustrated with the
following example.
Assume the disputed tax is eleven times greater than 
expected court costs as illustrated in Equation 6-7:
6-7 T=11
A S  a result, 6-5 would be restated as:
6-8 11C-C=C, which is simplified to
6-8 10C=C
In this situation, the costs associated with not litigating 
when the transaction would be deemed a lease are ten times 
as large as those of an unsuccessful challenge. Thus, 
Equation 6-1 would be
6-10 Lo s s=10Ei-1E2 
Using this function, the loss associated with each potential 
cut off point as illustrated in Figure 6-3. As can be seen, 
.808 would be the point that minimizes the costs of 
misclassification. Accordingly, taxpayers can easily adjust 
the cutoff point to conform to the relationships in - their 
particular cases.
BZTEBNAL VALIDITY 
As discussed earlier, external validity is concerned 
with the amount of reality that has been captured by the 
model and its applicability to observations not examined. 
To a large extent, this depends upon the representativeness
FIGURE 6-3
MISCLASSIFICATION COSTS
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Cutpoint Incorrect Predictions Loss Loss
Success [ Fail 1 Total E1=E2 E1=5E2
. 258 7 14 21 21 147
.275 7 13 20 20 137
.292 7 11 18 18 117
.308 8 11 19 19 118
.325 8 11 19 19 118
.342 8 10 18 18 108
. 358 8 10 18 18 108
.375 8 18 18 18 108
.392 8 10 18 18 108
.408 8 8 16 16 88
.425 7 8 15 15 87
.442 7 8 15 15 87
.458 8 6 14 14 68
.475 8 6 14 14 68
.492 8 5 13 13 58
.508 9 5 14 14 59
.525 9 5 14 14 59
.542 9 5 14 14 59
.558 9 5 14 14 59
. 575 12 5 17 17 62
.592 14 5 19 19 64
.608 15 4 19 19 55
.625 15 4 19 19 55
.642 15 4 19 19 55
.658 18 3 21 21 48
.675 18 3 21 21 48
.692 19 3 21 21 49
.708 19 3 21 21 49
.725 19 3 21 21 49
.742 20 3 23 23 50
.758 20 3 23 23 50
.775 21 3 24 24 51
.792 21 3 24 24 51
.808 21 2 23 23 41
.825 21 2 23 23 41
.642 21 2 23 23 41
.858 21 2 23 23 41
. 875 24 2 26 26 44
. 892 25 2 27 27 45
.908 42 0 42 42 41
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of the analysis sample. If cases analyzed had similar 
characteristics to all lease transactions, the identified 
model should be highly generalizable. However, if they were 
different, generalizability may be limited. Because only 
litigated lease agreements were examined, nonlitigated 
transactions were omitted. If those excluded differed in 
some manner from litigated cases, the identified model may 
not accurately predict their outcome. This could be a 
serious problem because one potential contribution of this 
study is to aid taxpayers in their decision of whether or 
not to litigate. Presumably, in this situation, taxpayers 
carefully examine their transactions before they decide to 
contest a reclassification by the Service. Some factors may 
be important in this decision if the existence of those 
variables with particular values automatically determined 
that the court would agree with the Service. Accordingly, 
taxpayers would not be willing to challenge the Service in 
those circumstances, implying that litigated cases would not 
have that value for those variables.
Host commentators agree that an automatic transfer of 
title is a strong indication that a sale has taken place. 
As a result, one would expect few leases containing that 
provision to be litigated. Nevertheless, Figure 6-4 reveals 
that twenty-two of the eighty-one lease agreements analyzed 
had that very provision. This is very surprising since the 
above discussion would have led one to believe that 
taxpayers would not have contested those reclassifications.
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FIGOEE 6-4
FREQOEHCT DISTRIBUTION OF VARIABLE X6
VALUE HUHBER OF OBSERVATIONS
0 22
6.9 1
11.2 1
12.9 1
13.3 1
20.3 1
27.1 1
31.<4 1
37.5 1
45.a 1
48.5 1
50.0
56.5
57.1 1
59.4 1
59.7 1
60.0 1
67.7 1
70.0 1
75.0 3
80.0 1
84.8 1
89.6 1
93.3 1
95.2 2
97.4 1
100.0 26
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The fact that they did may indicate that litigated and 
nonlitigated cases are not as different as one might have 
thought.
Finally, as stressed in Chapter T, these findings are 
tentative and should not be viewed as definitive 
conclusions. The small sample size prevented this. 
Accordingly, the critical value for the relationship of 
option price to value of 68.07 should be interpreted as an 
indication of judicial philosophy and not as a magic number 
that judges use to classify transactions as either sales or 
leases.
BECOMMENDATIONS FOB FUTDBE STODI
This study raised many interesting questions that could 
be pursued in future studies. Potential subjects for 
analysis include:
1) A study determine the impact Bev. Proc. 75-12 had 
upon the judicial process. Unfortunately, there were not 
sufficient cases after 1975 to accomplish this in the 
present project.
2) An examination to determine the effect exercise of 
purchase options might have on judges* decisions. Though 
exercise signifies nothing of original intent, it may bias 
judicial interpretations of other factors.
3) An investigation of the consensus and disagreement 
of individual judges. To do this, models predicting single 
judge's decisions could be compared and contrasted.
4) A determination of similarity of litigated and
1U0
nonlitigated cases. As indicated earlier, the study's 
findings nay not be generalizable to nonlitigated cases if 
they have different characteristics from those that were 
examined. A  possible way to accomplish this goal would be 
to compare transactions in the Service's private letter 
rulings with those that were litigated.
5) A major finding of this study was that the 
judiciary has been more lenient in its examination of lease 
transactions than has the Service, which, as Berlin (1975) 
observed, may increase the costs and uncertainties 
associated with leases. Further studies could contrast the 
costs of leases under the courts* and Service's guidelines 
to determine whether any difference exists. Evidence of 
discord could stimulate public analysis of the 
administrative position, possibly with the effect of 
increasing the certainty and uniformity of application 
between the executive and judicial branches of government.
This study attempted to aid taxpayers and policy makers 
by demonstrating that the judiciary does not require option 
prices to equal expected values. Though a cut off value of 
68.07 was found in this study to explain the vast majority 
of lease decisions, the sample size was too small to 
conclude that this ratio can automatically predict judicial 
distinctions between sales and leases. Accordingly, 
uncertainty still exists. In contrast. Congress provided 
some degree of assurance for corporate lessors by creating 
finance leases. Instead of having to analyze confusing and
141
conflicting judicial and adainsistcative rulings on options, 
parties to a finance lease can have an option as low as ten 
percent of the asset's original cost without fear that their 
transaction will be reclassified. Since nonfinasce lessors 
and lessees will not have this advantage. Congress should 
prevent this unequal treatment by creating provisions for 
nonfinance leases. In this manner, certainty of application 
will exist for all leases, without regard to the business 
form of the lessor.
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APPENDIX II 
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF SALE
CASE HAIN MODEL MODEL FOB MODEL FOR MODEL FOR
FIRST PERIOD SECOND PERIOD THIRD PERIOD
1.
2.
ABRAHAHSON 
ARK. BANK
.2573095
.2573095
.316479
.316479
.1946616
.1946616
.118157
.118157
3. BBAODBT .3646217 .383405 ,3386939 .251543
4. BENTON .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
5. BEOS .5030900 .464216 .5437925 .4860411
6. BOREN .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
7. B. VENEER .8603738 .713405 .9459858 .9621431
8. BROHN PAPER .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
9. CAL-MAINE .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
10. CALBON .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
11. CHALLENGER .8619665 .714989 .9469866 .9630148
12. C. STOKER .5900761 .515560 .6680237 .6423205
13. CITIZES* NAT. .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
14. CONSOL. ROCK .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
15. CONVERSE .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
16. CDBIC .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
17. DANIEL .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
18. DAWSON .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
19. EAST COAST .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
20. EATON .5714868 .504410 .6423641 .6097592
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APPENDIX II
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF SALE
CASE MAIN MODEL MODEL FOR MODEL FOB MODEL FOB
FIRST PERIOD SECOND PERIOD THIRD PERIQl
21. FNT PARK .2573095 .316479 ,1946616 ,118157
22. FINNEI .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
23. FOELLINGER .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
24. FRENZEL .8314586 .686111 .9263549 .9442756
25. 6ILKEN .2741476 .327490 .2155889 .1355562
26. GORDON .4022738 .405645 .3936489 .3100255
27. GEN .9055096 .316479 .9712515 .9827068
28. HAGGARD .6456563 .549834 .7407749 .7339975
29. HARRAH .5900761 .515560 .680237 .6423205
30. HA7ERSTICK .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
31. Helser Bach. .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
32. Holeproof .8685456 .721662 .9510478 .9665086
33. Holzvarth .4840055 .453138 .515495 .4514039
34. Home News .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
35. Hill .6456563 .549834 .7407749 .7339975
36. Irby .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
37. Jefferson Gas .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
38. Johnson .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
39. Judson Mills .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
40. Kearney .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
41. Kitchin .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
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APPENDIX II 
PBEDICTED PROBABILITIES OF SALE
CASE MAIN MODEL MODEL FOB MODEL FOB MODEL FOB
FIRST PERIOD SECOND PERIOD THIRD PEBIO
Lemon .6456563 .549834 .7407749 .7339975
43. Leasing .5948857 .518467 .6745638 .6506165
44. Lester .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
45. Lockhart .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
46. Lodzeiski .7339975 .608855 .8412422 .8546131
47. LTV .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
48. H&H Gear .6569654 .557026 .75474 84 .7513359
49. Martin .3020489 .345242 .2518029 .1673327
50. HcClintock .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
51. Heiselman .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
52. Midwest Metal .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
53. Ht. Mansfield .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
54. Hew Eng. Tank .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
55, Northwest Acc, .6835209 .316479 .118157
56. Oesterreich .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
57. Pitney-Bowes .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
58. Reade Mfg. .6456563 .549834 .7407749 .7339975
59. Robinson .6797711 .571810 .7819796 .7847052
60. Rochester .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
61. Eotorite .569046 .502 955 .6389524 .6054318
62. San Diego Tran.2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
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APPENDIX II
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF SALS
CASE BAIN MODEL MODEL FOR MODEL FOR MODEL FOE
FIRST PERIOD SECOND PERIOD THIRD PBRIC
63. Smith, A .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
6U. Smith, C .4427521 .429228 .4538815 .3781284
63. Smith, C .4427521 .429228 .4538815 .3781284
66. Smith, C .3840054 .738105 .9600417 .9739806
67. Smith, N .5666018 .501500 .6355265 .6010879
68. Smith, M .4427521 .429228 .4538815 .3781284
69. Starr .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
70. Strickland ,7958052 ,655716 .898554 .9168616
71. Standen .3285567 .361643 .2877699 .2008805
72. Smigart .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
73. Taft .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
74. Tomlinson .5948857 .518467 .6745638 .6506165
75. Oni. Drill .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
76. Valkenbnrgh .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
77. Van Etten .288919 .336958 .2345348 .1519227
78. HBSR .288919 .336958 .2345348 .1519227
79. Batson .9055096 .763145 .9712515 .9827068
80. Wallace .7716268 .636647 .8774865 .8947589
81. Western Cont. .2573095 .316479 .1946616 .118157
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&PPEMDEX III
CLASSIFICATION OF CASES USING FASB AND IBS GUIDELINES
CASE FASB IBS
Abrahaasoo Lease Lease
Ak. Bank and Trast Sale Sale
Beaudry Sale Sale
Benton Lease Sale
Bens Sale Sale
Bowen Sale Sale
Breece Veneer Sale Sale
Brown Paper Mill Lease Lease
Cal-Maine Foods Lease Sale
Calbon Sale Sale
Challenger Sale Sale
Chicago Stoke Sale Sale
Citizens National Sale Sale
Consolidated Bock Lease Lease
Converse Sale Lease
Cubic Lease Lease
Daniel Lease Sale
Dawson Sale Sale
East Coast Equipment Sale Sale
Estate of Eaton Sale Sale
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CLASSIFICATION OF CASES OSINS FASB AND IPS GUIDELINES
CASE FASB IBS
Fairmont Park Lease Sale
Finney Sale Sale
Foellinger Sale Sale
Frenzel Sale Sale
Silken Sale Sale
Gordon Sale Sale
Gen Lease Sale
Gross Sale Sale
Haggard Sale Sale
Harrah Sale Sale
Haverstick Lease Lease
Helser Machine Sale Sale
Holeproof Hosiery Sale Sale
Holzvarth Sale Sale
Home News Sale Sale
Hill Sale Sale
• Irby Sale Sale
Jefferson Gas Sale Sale
Johnson Sale Sale
Jndson Mills Sale Sale
Kearney Sale sale
Kitchin Sale Sale
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CLASSIFICATION OF CASES USING FASB AND 1RS GUIDELINES
CASE FASB 1RS
Lemon Sale Sale
Lensing Sale Sale
Lester Sale Sale
Lockhart Sale Sale
Lodzieski Sale Sale
LTV Lease Lease
NSW Gear Sale Sale
Martin Sale Sale
HcClintock Lease Lease
Heiselman Sale Sale
Midwest Metal Sale Sale
Mt. Mansfield Sale Sale
New England Tank Sale Sale
Northwest Acceptance Lease Lease
Oestereich Sale Sale
Pitney-Bowes Sale Sale
Reade ManufactBring Sale Sale
Robinson vs. Elliot Sale Sale
Rochester Sale Sale
Rotorite Sale Sale
San Diego Transis Lease Lease
Smith, Alexander Sale Sale
Smith, Charles Sale Sale
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CLASSIFICATION OF CASES USING FASB AND 1RS GUIDELINES
CASE FASB 1RS
Smith, Charles Sale Sale
Smith, Charles Sale Sale
Smith, Norman Sale Sale
Smith, Norman Sale Sale
Starr Sale Sale
Strickland Sale Sale
Standen Sale Sale
Svigart Sale Sale
Taft Sale Sale
Tomlinson Sale Sale
Universal Drilling Lease Lease
Valkenbnrgh Sale Sale
Van Etten Lease Lease
HBSB Sale Sale
Watson Sale Sale
Wallace Sale Sale
Western Contracting Lease Lease
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